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THE BOUNDARY OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION: THE "EFFECTS TEST"
AND THE PROTECTION OF
CRAZY HORSE'S NAME
SCOw FRUEHWALD*
1
Personal jurisdiction affects dignity. While most attorneys
consider personal jurisdiction a strategic device, personal
jurisdiction can have a profound impact on the dignity of both
plaintiffs and defendants. Obviously, a state violates the dignity of
a defendant when it asserts jurisdiction over a person or entity
with which it has little or no connection. Less obviously, a state
affects a plaintiffs dignity when it limits personal jurisdiction too
much, thereby preventing that plaintiff from rectifying wrongs
caused by others.
The litigation concerning the protection of Crazy Horse's
name demonstrates how personal jurisdiction can affect the
dignity of both plaintiffs and defendants, and it tests the boundary
of personal jurisdiction. 2 The Hornell Brewing Company used the

" Hofstra University School of Law.
1. "Personal jurisdiction is a court's power to make a binding adjudication
of a person's rights and obligations." Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the
Future:PersonalJurisdictionfor the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
385, 387 (1998). Courts generally distinguish between two types of personal
jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Mary Twitchell, The
Myth of General Jurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 610-11 (1988).
If a court asserted jurisdiction based on the affiliations between the
forum and one of the parties without regard to the nature of the dispute,
it was exercising general jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, a court
asserted jurisdiction based on affiliations between the forum and the
controversy, as was usually the case in the twentieth century, it was
exercising specific jurisdiction.
Id. at 611. This Article concerns specific jurisdiction.
2. Estate of Witko v. Hornell Brewing Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (2001).
See also Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087
(8th Cir. 1998); Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Representation:
Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Jessica R. Herrera,
Note, Not Even His Name: Is the Denigrationof Crazy Horse Custer's Final
Revenge?, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175 (1994); Antonia C. Novello, Crazy
Horse Malt Liquor Beverage: The Public Outcry to Save the Image of a Native
American Hero, 38 S.D. L. REV. 14 (1993). See the Crazy Horse Defense
Project website, at http://crazyhorsedefense.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
Crazy Horse is called Tasunke Witko in Lakota. Herrera, supra, at 175. He
died in 1877, and he is best known for defeating Custer at the Battle of the
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Crazy Horse name in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
' The Original Crazy Horse Malt Liquor."3 A descendant of Crazy
Horse, who was acting as administrator of his estate, and the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe sued Hornell and two individuals connected
with Hornell in federal court in South Dakota, claiming
"defamation, misappropriation and misuse of inheritable property
rights, privacy violations, .. . negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress," and "violations of the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act, the Lanham Act, and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act." 4
The plaintiffs were troubled that Crazy Horse's name had been
associated with alcohol because he "is the renowned and beloved
leader of the Lakota Sioux who dedicated his life to protecting the
cultural ways of his people and who vigorously opposed the use of
alcohol by the Lakota people."5 The two individual defendants
moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, declaring
that "they had not personally or individually transacted any
business in South Dakota, and that Hornell Brewing Co., doing
business as Ferolito, Vultaggio and Sons, has not and does not
manufacture, advertise, sell or distribute Crazy Horse Malt Liquor
6
in South Dakota."
Personal jurisdiction was the key issue in the case. Because
the essential claim in the litigation was based on tribal law, the
plaintiffs might not have succeeded on the merits if the case were
not heard in South Dakota, their home state. Thus, the ability of
the Crazy Horse estate and his tribe to protect their dignity would
be foreclosed. On the other hand, if the court asserted jurisdiction
over the defendants when they had only a tenuous connection to
South Dakota, their dignity would be violated.
This Article will analyze the boundary of personal jurisdiction
by examining the Crazy Horse litigation and the "effects test,"
which the court used to find personal jurisdiction over the
defendants. Part I of the Article will discuss the current Supreme
Court view on personal jurisdiction, and it will examine the effects
test, which the federal courts have used to take the boundary of
personal jurisdiction to its limit. Part II will discuss the Crazy
Horse litigation and the clash of cultures and laws involved in that
case. Finally, Part III will evaluate the current Supreme Court
rules on personal jurisdiction, the effects test, and the analysis of

Little Big Horn. Id. at 175-76.
3. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1099. "Sioux" refers to a group of Native American peoples who
have traditionally occupied the Dakotas. Herrera, supra note 2, at 175 n.3.
The Sioux comprise "three nations: the Santee (Dakota), the Yankton
(Nakota), and the Teton (Lakota)." Id. Crazy Horse was an Oglala, one of the
seven bands that made up the Lakota nation. Id.
6. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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personal jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse litigation. It will also
present this author's views on the boundary of personal
jurisdiction.
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER OUT-OF-STATE DEFENDANTS
AND THE "EFFECTS TEST"

A. International Shoe and Its Progeny
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington established the modern
test for the validity of service of process on out-of-state defendants
7
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
International Shoe, the Court held that personal jurisdiction was
proper in Washington over a Delaware corporation, with its
principal place of business in Missouri, even though it had no
office in Washington and did not make contracts for the sale and
purchase of merchandise there, because the presence of eleven to
thirteen salesmen in Washington created minimum contacts with
the state.8 The Court declared:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
9
play and substantial justice.
The Court noted:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
10
contacts, ties, or relations.
The Court continued:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations rise out

7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Professor George Rutherglen has declared: "The
modern law of personal jurisdiction owes its existence, and most of its
structure and detail, to Chief Justice Stone's magisterial opinion in
International Shoe v. Washington." George Rutherglen, International Shoe
and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 347 (2001).
8. 326 U.S. at 313-19.
9. Id. at 316.
10. Id. at 319.
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of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.1
Based on this standard, the Court ruled in a later case that a
California court had personal jurisdiction over an insurance
company whose only tie to the state was a single insurance policy
with a forum resident when the lawsuit concerned that insurance
policy. 12 In contrast, the Court found that jurisdiction was not
proper over a trustee who had no connection to Florida, even
though Florida had jurisdiction over the other important parties to
the trust,13 and not proper over a New York parent who had
allowed his children to live with their mother in California in a
suit in a California court for child support. 14
Later the Court separated the minimum contacts analysis
from the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
analysis, creating a minimum contacts requirement and a
reasonableness requirement. 5
Under the minimum contacts
analysis,
courts
look
at
purposeful
availment
and/or
foreseeability.16 Concerning purposeful availment, the Court has
written:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the
quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
7
of its laws.1
Furthermore:
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts, or of the "unilateral activity of
another party or a third person." Jurisdiction is proper, however,
where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant
himself that create a "substantial connection" with the forum State.
Thus, where the defendant "deliberately" has engaged in significant
11. Id.
12. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
13. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
14. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985).
See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-16
(1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980).
16. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-76. The Supreme Court's analysis of
personal jurisdiction is not always consistent, although one might say that the
Court is adapting the criteria to different situations-e.g., contracts, torts, etc.
17. Id. at 474-75.
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activities within a State, or has created "continuing obligations"
between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and
because his activities are shielded by "the benefits and protections"
of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require
8
him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.'
The Court has written concerning the foreseeability criteria:
By requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a particular
activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
the Due Process Clause "gives a degree of
sovereign," ...
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
19
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
This "requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and
the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or
20
Such jurisdiction is justifiable under
relate to' those activities."
the Due Process Clause because a state "has a 'manifest interest'
in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing
21
In addition, it might be
injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors."
unfair to permit individuals to escape from jurisdiction when they
have purposefully derived a benefit from their interstate activities;
"the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a
territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been
22
voluntarily assumed."
Foreseeability alone, however, does not establish personal
23
jurisdiction.
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection
that he should reasonably anticipate
with the forum State are such
24
being haled into court there.
Thus, the Court held that Oklahoma may not "exercise in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and
its wholesale distributor in a products-liability action, when the
defendants' only connection with Oklahoma... [was] the fact that
an automobile sold in New York to New York residents... [was]

18. Id. at 475-76 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 472 (citations omitted). See also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
20. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id. at 474.
23. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
24. Id. at 297.
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involved in an accident in Oklahoma."25
Furthermore, the
defendant's action must "be more purposefully directed at the
forum State than the mere act of placing a product in the stream
of commerce. '26 The Court later elaborated:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example,...
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State. 27
Therefore, a California court did not have personal
jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer of components who was
aware that the components, which were manufactured, sold, and
delivered outside California, would reach the state in the stream of
28
commerce.
B. Calder and the Effects Test
Traditional concepts like "purposeful availment" and
"foreseeability" do not always work well when applied to
intentional conduct outside a state that causes injury within a
state. However, courts have tried to tie these terms to such
situations. For example, courts have stated that "within the
rubric of 'purposeful availment' the [Supreme] Court has allowed
the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact'
with the forum state is the 'purposeful direction' of a foreign act
having effect in the forum state."29
Similarly, courts have
connected this situation with foreseeability: an "activity by the
defendant need not physically take place in the forum state ."..30
as long as the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there." 31 Fortunately, however, most courts have used a
test (the "effects test") especially developed to evaluate personal
jurisdiction when conduct outside a state causes injury in the
state.

25. Id. at 287, 299.
26. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110.
27. Id. at 112.

28. Id. at 105-14.
29. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d

1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104,
1111 (9th Cir. 2002).
30. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397.
31. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
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Calder v. Jones

The Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones held that jurisdiction
was proper when a defendant acting outside a state caused harm
within a state (the "effects test"). 32 In Calder, actress Shirley
Jones, a California resident, sued the National Enquirer, its
distributing company, one of its reporters, and its president and
editor for libel. 33 The reporter and editor, who had been served by
mail in Florida, contested the California court's jurisdiction over
them. 3 4 The article had been written and edited in Florida and
distributed nationally.35 Jones lived and worked in California.
The magazine had its largest distribution in California, it was
incorporated in Florida, and its principal place of business was
there. 36 The reporter was a Florida resident who traveled six to
twelve times a year on business to California.3 7 He mainly
researched the article in Florida, but he did make several phone
calls to California concerning the article, including one to Jones's
husband to elicit his comments on the article. 38 He had "no other
relevant contacts with California."39 The editor was a Florida
resident who had been to California only twice on unrelated
40
matters.
41
The trial court granted defendants' motion to quash service.
Although the court felt that jurisdiction would ordinarily be proper
when actions in one state caused injury in the forum, it believed
that "special solicitude was necessary because of the potential
'chilling effect' on reporters and editors which would result from
requiring them to appear in remote jurisdictions to answer for the
content of articles upon which they worked." 42 The California
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the defendants had
intended to and did cause tortious injury to the plaintiff in
California. 43 The court noted, "[t]he fact that the actions causing
the effects in California were performed outside the State did not
prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising out of those effects." 44 The court also rejected the lower
court's conclusion that First Amendment considerations were

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
Id. at 784-86.
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 785-86, 785 n.3.
Id. at 785-86.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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relevant. 45 The California Supreme Court denied a motion for a
hearing, and the United States Supreme Court granted the
46
petitioners' writ of certiorari.
The Court held that jurisdiction was proper, noting that "the
plaintiff is the focus of the activities ... out of which the suit
arises."47 It declared: "California is the focal point both of the
story and of the harm suffered." 48 The Court wrote:
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a
California resident.
It impugned the professionalism of an
entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The
article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the
harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the
injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. 49
The reporter and editor had argued that jurisdiction did not
exist under the foreseeability rule of World-Wide Volkswagen. 5o
They had contended that they had no direct economic stake in the
Enquirer's sales in California and that they were not responsible
for the article's circulation there because ordinary employees
cannot control their company's marketing practices. 51 They had
asserted that under World-Wide Volkswagen, the "mere fact that
they can 'foresee' that the article will be circulated and have an
effect in California is not sufficient for an assertion of
jurisdiction." 52 They had comparedthemselves to welders working
in Florida on a boiler that later explodes in California.53 Even if
jurisdiction over the boiler's manufacturer was proper in
California, jurisdiction should not be valid over the welders who
had no control over and derived no benefit from sales in
54
California.
The Court rejected this foreseeability argument. 55 The Court
pointed out that, unlike a welder, the editor and writer were "not
charged with mere untargeted negligence." 56 They knew that the
article would have a devastating impact on Jones and that the

45. Id.
46. Id. at 787-88.

47. Id. at 788. The Court also rejected the petitioners' First Amendment

argument. Id. at 790. The Court declared, "the potential chill on protected

First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is
already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive
law governing such suits." Id.
48. Id. at 789.
49. Id. at 788-89.
50. Id. at 789.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

55. Id. at 789-90.
56. Id. at 789.
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brunt of the harm would be felt in California, where Jones lived
and worked.57 In other words, the writer and editor satisfied the
World-Wide Volkswagen requirement that a defendant must
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there ....,"58 The
Court added: "An individual injured in California need not go to
Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in
Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California."59
The Court also remarked that jurisdiction was independent of
the petitioners' employer's contacts with California.60 The Court
explained, "petitioners are primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis."6 1 Their status as
62
employees does not shield them from liability.
2.

The Effects Test in Lower Courts

Lower courts have developed a three-part effects test for
specific jurisdiction based on Calder. Under the test, the plaintiff
must show:
1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; 2) The plaintiff felt
the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can be said
to be the focal point of the harm suffered as a result of the tort; 3)
The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious
63
activity.
Although Calder involved libel, the first part of the test can
,involve any type of intentional tort or similar intentional conduct,
64
including fraud, trademark infringement, business torts, etc.
Courts have found jurisdiction proper under the effects test
when a foreign defendant commits fraud that causes harm in the
forum.6 5 For example, in Finley v. River North Records, an

57. Id. at 789-90.
58. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. William Rosenstein & Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d
268, 273 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Keikert AG, 155 F.3d
254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998)). Accord Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l.,
Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Zumbro v. Cal. Natural Prods., 861
F. Supp. 773, 782-83 (D. Minn. 1994).
64. See the examples below in infra notes 65-175 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114 (allowing fraud suit by Californiabased company versus European defendants); Oriental Trading Co., Inc. v.
Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001); Finley v. River North Records, 148
F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1998); Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 124 F. Supp.
2d 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (allowing third-party complaint by Washington
resident against New York art dealer).
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Arkansas federal district court had jurisdiction over an out-ofstate record company who had induced plaintiffs, concert
promoters, to enter into a concert promotion contract by falsely
representing to the plaintiffs that certain pop stars would be
appearing at a concert at the University of Arkansas. 66 An
employee of the record company had sent promotional materials
into Arkansas, knowing that they would be used to promote the
concert. 67 The court held that this was "fraudulent conduct,
68
intended to induce commercial activity within the forum state."
Similarly, in Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, a Nebraska court had
jurisdiction over a Virginia company that had fraudulently
represented that it had paid anti-dumping import duties on
pencils and crayons it had imported from China for the plaintiff, a
Nebraska corporation. 69 Although the defendants had never
entered Nebraska and only made phone calls and faxes to
Nebraska, the fraud was directed at residents of Nebraska where
70
the harm was felt.
Courts have also allowed jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home
state over out-of-state defendants in trademark cases when the
injury was primarily felt in the forum state. 71 For example, a
Missouri court held that personal jurisdiction was proper against a
New York marketer of postcards, when that marketer had used a
Missouri corporation's trademark on its postcards. 72 On the other
hand, other cases have rejected jurisdiction in trademark
infringement cases in the state of the plaintiffs principal place of
business when the injury was not aimed at the forum. 73 For
example, the court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc. stated that a trademark infringement on a "passive website"
66. 148 F.3d at 914, 917.
67. Id. at 916.
68. Id.
69. 236 F.3d at 943.
70. Id.
71. E.g., Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384,
1388 (8th Cir. 1991); Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football
Club L.P., 34 F.3d 410, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1994); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. City
Merchandise, 176 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956-57 (E.D. Mo. 2001); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-66 (D. Conn. 1996). I will discuss
Dakota Industries in detail below at infra notes 130-42 and accompanying
text.
72. Anheuser-Busch, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 957-59.
73. E.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d
390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20
(9th Cir. 1997) (involving an Arizona corporation that had registered a
trademark versus a Florida corporation who had used the same trademark on
its Internet website); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1125-27 (W.D.Pa. 1997) (finding jurisdiction in this case, but
setting a narrow standard for evaluating jurisdiction in certain cases involving
the Internet).
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did not establish jurisdiction. 74 This case distinguished among
interactive, semi-interactive, and passive websites. 75 A passive
website simply makes information available, a semi-interactive
website allows the user to exchange information with the website,
and an active website involves the knowing and repeated
76
transmission of computer files over the Internet.
Similar to trademark cases, courts have allowed jurisdiction
when there is an intentional violation of a statute. 77 For instance,
a Nevada court had jurisdiction over a Utah law firm under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") when one of its paralegals, a
plaintiff in a lawsuit, wrongfully requested credit reports on the
Nevada defendants in that lawsuit because the paralegal had
78
intentionally aimed his conduct at Nevada.
Some courts have also permitted jurisdiction under Calder
when business torts were involved. 79 In Janmark v. Reidy, the
court held that jurisdiction was proper in Illinois in a case
concerning intentional interference with business relations.80 A
California mini shopping cart seller had threatened an Illinois
competitor's customers with suits for contributory copyright
infringement.81 One threat caused a New Jersey customer to stop
buying from the Illinois company. s 2 The court felt that the injury
occurred in Illinois, where the company suffered the harm from
the cancelled order, so jurisdiction was constitutional there.8 3 It
should be noted, however, that several courts have decided that
the application of Calder to business torts should result in a
narrow construction of the test.8 4 For example, the court in
74. 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. E.g., Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 1075.
79. E.g., Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements (London),
Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing jurisdiction in action
for intentional interference with contract and business relations); Remick v.
Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 260-64 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a Pennsylvania
court had jurisdiction over Illinois lawyers who had allegedly interfered with
plaintiffs, a Pennsylvania law firm, contract with an Indiana client);
Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1997).
80. 132 F.3d at 1201.
81. Id. at 1202.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 261. See also Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne,
46 F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 1995); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc.,
851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1988); Esab Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126
F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 1997); Hicklin Eng'g, Inc. v. Aidco, 959 F.2d 738, 739
(8th Cir. 1992) (reading Calder narrowly); Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick
Washroom Equip., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 710, 717 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Zumbro, 861
F. Supp at 783; Roquette Am., Inc. v. Gerber, 651 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2002) (also reading Caldernarrowly).
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Hicklin stated that jurisdiction was not proper in Iowa in a
business torts case when the only contact with Iowa was that the
85
plaintiffs principal place of business was there.
Establishing where the brunt of the harm was felt, the second
prong of the effects test, can be difficult in some cases.8 6 Myers v.
Bennett Law Offices considered whether the harm from improperly
obtaining a credit report in violation of the FCRA occurred in
Utah, where the credit report was accessed, or in Nevada, where
the plaintiff lived.8 7 The court noted that the FCRA is intended to
protect consumer confidentiality.88 Like right to privacy cases,
when a consumer's confidentiality is violated, the main damage is
mental distress from having private information revealed
publicly.8 9 Since such mental distress occurs where the plaintiff
resides, the harm in this case was felt in Nevada, and jurisdiction
was proper there. 90
Some courts have relaxed the brunt of the harm standard,
allowing jurisdiction in more than one state. As one court has
noted, the existence of jurisdiction in one state does not
necessarily preclude jurisdiction in another state.91 For instance,
"a corporation can suffer economic harm both where the bad acts
occurred and where the corporation has its principal place of
business. '92 Another judge has written that Calder does not
require that the brunt of the harm be in the forum, but that it was
only a factor weighing in favor of purposeful direction in that
case. 93 He declared: "To the contrary, the Court held that
jurisdiction was proper because 'petitioners [were] primary
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a
California resident.' 9 4
Expressly aiming, the third prong of the effects test,
"encompasses wrongful conduct individually targeting a known
forum resident."95 Some courts have further stated that the
defendant must know "that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of
the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum, and point to
85. 959 F.2d at 739.
Personal jurisdiction "cannot be
86. Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486-87.
answered through... a mechanical test but instead must focus on the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation within the
particular factual context of each case." Id. at 1487.
87. 238 F.3d at 1073-74.
88. Id. at 1074.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1113. See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) ("There is no justification for restricting libel actions
to plaintiffs home forum.").
92. Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1113.
93. Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1492 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790).
95. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087.
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specific activity indicating that the defendant expressly aimed its
Individualized targeting
tortious conduct at the forum."96
separates these cases from cases where the effects test is not
97
satisfied.
For instance, a California court had jurisdiction over an
Alabama resident who sent a letter to an insurance company,
claiming she was entitled to an insurance benefit that actually
belonged to a California resident, because the defendant had
purposefully defrauded the plaintiff in California. 98 Similarly, an
Arizona court had jurisdiction in a libel case involving phone calls
directed to defendants in Canada because the defendants knew
their actions would be felt in Arizona. 99 Likewise, a California
court had jurisdiction over a Georgia corporation that had
contested a California corporation's use of a domain name by
sending a letter to Virginia to the sole registrar of domain names
in the United States because the letter individually targeted the
California company. 10 0
In contrast, a court found that Ohio did not have jurisdiction
over the International Amateur Athletic Foundation in a case
where it had issued an allegedly libelous press release, claiming
that the plaintiff, an internationally known track star, had failed a
drug test. 101 The release concerned the plaintiffs conduct in
Monaco, not Ohio, it involved a drug sample taken in Monaco and
tested in France, it was not published in Ohio by the defendant,
and the plaintiffs reputation was not centered in Ohio.102 In other
10 3
words, "Ohio was not the 'focal point' of the press release."'
Similarly, a court denied jurisdiction in South Carolina in a suit
brought by a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of
business in South Carolina, against Florida and New Hampshire
residents for the misappropriation of trade secrets and customer
lists.104 The court ruled that knowledge that a plaintiff with its
headquarters in South Carolina would lose sales was not enough
96. IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 266; Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535

(Minn. 2002).
97. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088.
98. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 1990).
See also Stevens v. Meaut, 264 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (involving
a slander of title outside of state while causing injury in plaintiffs home state).
99. Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th
Cir. 1989).

100. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1082, 1084-88.
101. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1114 (6th Cir.
1994).

102. Id. at 1120. The court noted that the fact that it was foreseeable that
the report would be circulated in Ohio and have an effect there was not
enough to create jurisdiction. Id.
103. Id.
104. Esab Group, 126 F.3d at 626. However, the court found that personal
jurisdiction did exist under the federal RICO statutes. Id. at 626-27.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:381

to create jurisdiction in South Carolina; otherwise, jurisdiction in
intentional tort cases would always be sufficient where the
plaintiff was headquartered. 105 Likewise, in a suit concerning the
right of publicity, a California court did not have jurisdiction over
an Ohio car dealer who had used a California actor's image in one
of the dealer's ads because the ad was aimed at Ohio, not
California. 10 6
Finally, a court thought that libel distributed
worldwide did not necessarily injure a corporation at its principal
place of business, thus not satisfying the targeting requirement. 107
Another court held that a libelous post on an internet bulletin
board did not meet the targeting requirement because there was
no evidence that the statements were targeted at the forum or a
08
forum resident.
3. Extended Examples of the Application of the Effects Test
Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd.
demonstrates the boundary of personal jurisdiction when a foreign
defendant who allegedly has not acted in the state is involved. 109
In Haisten, attorneys for a California hospital set up a self-insured
105. Id. at 625-26. See also Zumbro, 861 F. Supp. at 783 (disallowing
jurisdiction by a Minnesota court over a California company who had sent
letters to companies in Illinois and California, alleging that a Minnesota
corporation had committed patent infringement).
106. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799-807 (9th
Cir. 2004).
107. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486 ("[Although the medical journals were
circulated worldwide, it has not been alleged that California was a primary
audience for the medical journals or that the defendants knew that the
journals would be circulated in that state."). See also Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d
467, 473-76 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that not only was the article not directed
at the individual plaintiff at his home in Texas, but the defendant was
unaware that the plaintiff was a resident of Texas when he posted his article
on an internet bulletin board centered in New York); Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263-64 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying jurisdiction over
defendants in a suit brought by a Virginia prison warden involving articles in
Connecticut newspapers distributed over the Internet concerning coverage of
conditions in a Virginia prison that housed several Connecticut prisoners,
because the articles did not have the intent of targeting readers in Virginia);
Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (W.D. Tenn. 2000)
("Here, the defendants attacked the plaintiff in their website as a business
competitor who ... [the plaintiff] has conceded 'solicits conversions [of aircraft
engines] nationwide and worldwide."').
108. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535. See also Archer & White, Inc. v. Tishler, No.
3:03-CV-0742-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19010 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2003).
Professor Borchers has noted that "the reported cases leave open the
substantial possibility that courts facing internet libel jurisdiction cases are
striking out in their own direction with relatively little regard for the Supreme
Court's guidance." Patrick J. Borchers, Personal Jurisdictionin the Internet
Age: Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 473, 482 (2004).
109. 784 F.2d at 1392.
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medical malpractice fund in the Cayman Islands to insure its
California physicians. 110 The attorneys deliberately set up the
fund to avoid jurisdiction in (and insurance regulations of)
California.1" ' The fund was incorporated in the Cayman Islands,
it maintained its sole office there, all transactions and
communications were conducted in the Cayman Islands, and the
112
insureds did business through agents in the Cayman Islands.
Moreover, the fund claimed that it did not solicit business or
advertise in California. 113 Finally, the fund's insurance contract
stated that it was governed by Cayman Islands law, but that
disputes between the fund and its insureds would follow California
arbitration law. 114 Notably, under the insurance contract, the
fund was obligated to pay only if the insured had first paid
pursuant to a judgment or if there had been an approved
15
settlement, which was contrary to California law.
The plaintiffs wife had brought a malpractice claim against
one of the insureds. 116 She had received $185,000 in binding
arbitration, but the doctor filed bankruptcy and was discharged
from his obligation to the plaintiffs wife." 7 The plaintiff, as
administrator of his wife's estate, sued the fund in California to
obtain satisfaction of the arbitration judgment under California
law, "which requires the insurer to pay the outstanding
judgment[s] of a bankrupt insured.""18 The district court granted
the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.1 1 9
A major issue in the case was whether California had
In this case,
jurisdiction over the Cayman Islands fund. 120
although the defendant had
made a tremendous effort to construct a transaction in such a way
as to avoid the appearance of contacts with California, and thus the
reach of the California courts[,] ...[the Fund's] only purpose was to
patients
provide insurance for California doctors treating California
121
and to avoid requirements imposed by California law.
The court held that the fund had purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in California when it
"purposefully directed" its activities toward California residents. 122
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1395.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1396-1402.
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1397-98.
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The court reiterated that the lack of physical contacts with a state
does not defeat jurisdiction, when the defendant has purposefully
directed its activities toward residents of that state. 123 The court
emphasized that it is the substance, not the form, of the activities
that is important. 124 "[P]remiums from California physicians are
disbursed to California physicians who suffer loss due to
malpractice liability."'125 In other words, "the Fund's existence was
'for the benefit of California residents; to wit, California
doctors." '126 The court concluded that the fund's conduct "was
'purposefully directed' toward participation in the California
127
insurance market."
The court rejected the fund's argument that the purposefully
directed rule should be limited to products liability cases. 128 The
court asserted:
As in the products liability area, the state has a manifest interest in
providing its residents with a forum for reaching insurance
companies who refuse to honor legitimate claims. This is especially
true with regard to companies that insure against loss from liability
for personal injury, whose actions implicate the safety of the state's
29
residents.1
Another case that tested the boundary of personal jurisdiction
was Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., which
upheld jurisdiction in a case concerning an allegation of trademark
infringement. 130 Dakota Industries, a South Dakota corporation,
owned the incontestable trademark "Dakota" for certain types of
women's clothing. 131 Dakota Sportswear, a California corporation,
also manufactured women's clothing using the Dakota name. 32
Although Dakota Sportswear marketed "mostly in New York and
California," some of its clothing had been sold to consumers in
South Dakota. 33 The South Dakota district court "granted Dakota
Sportswear's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."134
The appellate court found jurisdiction under Calder because
"Sportswear's actions were uniquely aimed at the forum state and
that the 'brunt' of the injury would be felt there."'135 The defendant
alleged that it had no offices, agents, or property in South Dakota,
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1399.

129. Id. (citations omitted).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

946 F.2d at 1384.
Id. at 1386.
Id.
Id. at 1386-87.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1391.
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that it had not conducted any business there, and that it had not
shipped any items to South Dakota. 136 It further claimed that the
marketing of its product in South Dakota was the unilateral
activity of others. 137 Thus, the defendant argued that under Asahi,
which had declared that the "launching of a product into the
stream of commerce with the awareness that the stream 'may or
will sweep the product into the forum State' was insufficient to
13s
confer jurisdiction," South Dakota lacked jurisdiction over it.
The court distinguished Asahi on the ground that that case
involved a negligent tort-personal injury-while this case
involved trademark infringement-an intentional tort. 139 The
defendant had used a trademark with knowledge of the
infringement.140 It had twice been denied registration of the
trademark, and Dakota Industries had sent it a cease and desist
letter.' 4 ' The court concluded that under such circumstances, the
defendant 'must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court... in
142
South Dakota."'
Some cases have limited the boundary of personal jurisdiction
to protect defendants. These cases have found that jurisdiction did
not exist under the effects test because the brunt of the harm was
not felt in the forum or the defendant had not expressly aimed its
conduct at the forum. 143 For example, in William Rosenstein &
Sons Co. v. BBI Produce, Inc., the court held that jurisdiction was
not proper in Pennsylvania for libel published in Florida by a
Florida corporation.144 The plaintiff in William Rosenstein was a
fruit and vegetable wholesaler and distributor in Pennsylvania,
while the Florida corporation sold produce, principally
strawberries. 145 The defendant had allegedly sent a defamatory
1 46
statement by fax to sixteen other strawberry sellers in Florida.
The fax claimed that the plaintiff "had engaged in unsavory
business practices" with the defendant, after the plaintiff had
refused to pay for a shipment of strawberries. 1 47 The defendant
contended that it had no place of business, business operation,
bank account, agents, employees, or other ties to Pennsylvania. 148
The court believed that jurisdiction was not proper in

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1390.
Id.
Id. at 1390-91.
Id. at 1391.
Id.
Id.
Rosenstein, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Pennsylvania because the brunt of the harm was not felt there. 149
The court stated that the defendant "sent the allegedly libelous
facsimile to other strawberry sellers located in Florida. It is clear
that this facsimile would cause Rosenstein [the plaintiff] the
greatest injury in Florida, among those from whom Rosenstein
must purchase strawberries and other produce."'150 Similarly, the
defendant had not expressly aimed its tortious conduct at
Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania was not the "focal point of the
tortious activity."1 51 The defendant had not sent the fax to anyone
in Pennsylvania except the plaintiff, and the defendant would
have expected the harm to be centered in Florida, where the
152
producers received the fax.
Wolgin v. Fine Decorators,Inc. also held that jurisdiction was
not proper when the brunt of the harm was not felt in the forum
state. 153 In Wolgin, the plaintiff sued a real estate broker in
Pennsylvania, alleging fraud in connection with the sale of a
condominium in Florida. 5 4 The broker did business and was
licensed in Florida. 155 The broker had advertised in two national
magazines and made numerous calls to Pennsylvania that were
not proven to be tied to the litigation. 156 The court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that jurisdiction was proper under Calder
because harm was caused in Pennsylvania. 1 57 The court thought
that the focus of the broker's actions was Florida. 158 The suit
concerned a Florida condominium, and the condo was sold in
Florida.159
In addition, the improper furnishings and
uninhabitable condition of the condo occurred in Florida, and the
contract stated that the action would be litigated in Florida and
160
governed by Florida law.
The plaintiff also sued a decorator who had contracted to
make improvements on the condo. 161 The plaintiff and decorator
had signed a retainer agreement in Florida that specified that any
disputes would be settled by arbitration in Florida under Florida
law. 162 The decorator also faxed subsequent contracts to the

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
2001).
154.

Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 274.
No. 00-3997, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11461, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7,
Id. at *1.

155. Id. at *2.
156. Id. at *13-14.
157. Id. at *15-17.
158. Id. at *17.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at*17-21.
162. Id. at*18.
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plaintiff in Pennsylvania that had similar clauses. 163 While the
decorator had made no trips to Pennsylvania, the plaintiff had
made at least one trip to Florida to oversee the improvements and
discuss the dispute. 164 The court held that Pennsylvania lacked
jurisdiction over the decorator because the decorator was
accustomed to dealing with the plaintiff in Florida, so the focal
point of the activities was Florida; therefore, the decorator could
not have anticipated being sued in Pennsylvania.165 The court also
pointed out that, since the contracts were governed by Florida law
and required that all disputes be arbitrated in Florida, the
defendant had not purposefully directed its activities toward
Pennsylvania.166 Finally, the court remarked that the minimal
communications by fax with Pennsylvania by itself did not subject
67
the defendant to jurisdiction there.
Other cases have granted a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction because the conduct was not expressly aimed
at the forum-the forum was not the focal point of the harm. For
example, IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG held that a New
Jersey court did not have jurisdiction over foreign defendants
when a New Jersey corporation had been injured by a business
tort because the defendant had not expressly aimed its conduct at
New Jersey. 168 The plaintiff, a multinational corporation with its
principal place of business in New Jersey, tried to sell its Italian
subsidiary to a French company. 169 The defendant, a German
corporation that also wanted to buy the subsidiary, tried to block
the sale by threatening that it would revoke a licensing agreement
it had with the subsidiary in a series of letters it sent to the
subsidiary in Italy and a New York investment firm that was
handling the sale. 170 The sale was never completed because of the
71
threats, causing the plaintiff significant financial losses.
The court held that New Jersey did not have jurisdiction over
the defendant because it had not aimed its conduct at New
Jersey. 172 First, none of the meetings were in New Jersey, and the
correspondence was sent to New York and Italy, not New
Jersey. 73 Second, the letters demonstrate that the defendant was
focusing on the New York investment firm and the Italian

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at*19.
Id. at *20.
Id.
Id. at *18-19.
Id. at *19.
155 F.3d at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 267.
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subsidiary, not the New Jersey parent. 174 Finally, the fact that the
letters were forwarded to the New Jersey corporation and the New
Jersey corporation made phone calls to the defendants were not
175
enough to establish jurisdiction in New Jersey.
In sum, Calder expanded the availability of personal
jurisdiction over defendants who, while acting outside a state,
caused harm within that state. Lower courts have differed in their
interpretations of Calder, with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
usually applying it broadly and the Third Circuit narrowly.
C. Reasonableness in Effects Test Cases
As mentioned earlier, there is also a reasonableness element
to the personal jurisdiction inquiry: "Once it has been decided that
a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other
factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice."' 76 The
Court further stated that "where a defendant who purposefully
has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat
jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence
of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable." 177
However, "jurisdictional rules may not be
employed in such a way as to make litigation 'so gravely difficult
and inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a 'severe
78
disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent."'
Burger King used five factors to evaluate reasonableness: (1)
"the burden on the defendant," (2) "the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute," (3) "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief," (4) "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,"
and (5) the "shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies." 79 The Court noted:
"These considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required."'' 0
Lower courts have developed a seven-part test to determine
reasonableness in the context of Calder-like cases:
174. Id.
175. Id. at 268.
176. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. See also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16
(stating it was a severe burden when a Japanese defendant had to travel to
California to defend a lawsuit); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292
(noting the Due Process Clause "protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum").
177. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
178. Id. at 478.
179. Id. at 477. Accord Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16.
180. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

20041

The Boundary of PersonalJurisdiction

(1) the extent of the defendants' purposeful injection into the forum
state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the
forum; (3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendants' state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in
convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an
81
alternative forum.'
A court must balance all seven factors. 182 Core-Vent Corp. v.
Nobel Industries AB illustrates how one court applied this test to
foreign defendants. 8 3 In this case, four Swedish professorsworking as consultants to Nobelpharma, one of the two largest
manufacturers of dental implants in the world-had published
articles that allegedly made false comparisons of Nobelpharma's
and Core-Vent's dental implants. 184 Core-Vent was a California
corporation, and the articles had been published in magazines
with international circulation, including California. 8 5
The
defendants had only made limited visits to California; the most
186
had been five times in four years.
One ground the court used to uphold the trial court's grant of
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was the lack of
reasonableness. 87
First, the court found that the purposeful
injection into the forum factor favored the professors because their
contacts with the forum were attenuated. 8 8 Second, the court
concluded that the burden on the defendants in defending the
action in California was great because they had no ongoing
connection or relationship with the United States.' 89 The court
remarked that the plaintiff, a large international corporation,
would have less of a burden in bringing its claims in Sweden than
the four professors would have by defending in California. 190
Third, the court thought that the sovereignty factor weighed
heavily in favor of the defendants.' 9'
The court thought that
sovereignty concerns were more important when the defendants
192
had no United States-based relationships, as was true here.
181. Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114. See also Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1487-88
(using the term "purposeful interjection" instead of "purposeful injection");
Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, 757 F.2d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.
1985).
182. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991).
183. 11 F.3d at 1487-88.
184. Id. at 1483-84.
185. Id. at 1483-86.
186. Id. at 1483.
187. Id. at 1490.
188. Id. at 1488.
189. Id. at 1488-89.
190. Id. at 1489.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Fourth, California did have "a strong interest in providing an
effective means of redress for its residents [who are] tortiously
injured" because the plaintiff had its operations in and was
incorporated there, thus favoring the plaintiff on this factor. 193
Fifth, the court refused to consider the efficiency of the forum
because the parties had not addressed the primary location of the
witnesses and evidence. 9 4 However, the fact that the lawsuit
would "continue in California with other parties" favored the
plaintiff.1 95
Finally, the court evaluated the existence of an
96
alternate forum and the "effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff."'
The court thought that the plaintiff had not shown the
unavailability of suing the doctors in Sweden. 197 The court
declared: "The maintenance of a suit in Sweden may be costly and
inconvenient for Core-Vent, but Core-Vent has not shown that its
98
libel claims cannot be effectively remedied there."'
Based on a weighing of the factors, the court concluded that
"the Swedish doctors have presented a compelling case that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and
substantial justice and would thus be unreasonable."'199 Although
California had a strong interest in providing a forum to its citizens
who are injured in the state, "where the plaintiff is an
international corporation and where the defendants are individual
citizens of a foreign country who lack connections to the United
States and whose purposeful interjection into the forum state has
'200
been very limited, that interest must give way.
The fact that the dissent came to an opposite decision on the
reasonableness
part of the personal jurisdictional test
demonstrates that this part of the personal jurisdiction test is
difficult to apply in connection with defendants acting outside the
forum.20 The dissent thought that the first half of the testpurposeful availment-had been satisfied by the defendants'
conduct. 202 The dissent pointed out that once the first half of the
test is satisfied, the "burden of proof is now on the doctors to
'present a compelling case that the presence of some other
20 3
would render jurisdiction unreasonable."'
considerations
Concerning the first factor of the reasonableness test-the extent
of the defendants' purposeful interjection into forum state affairs193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1490.

197. Id.
198. Id.

199. Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
See id. at 1494-95 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1493-94.
Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
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the dissent questioned the majority opinion's statement that the
connections were attenuated because the complaint alleged that
the defendants were "primary participants in an alleged
wrongdoing intentionally aimed at a California resident. '204 The
dissent agreed with the majority concerning the burden on the
defendant, but it noted that all factors needed to be weighed in the
final determination. 20 5 The dissent also rejected the defendants'
contention that defending in a foreign legal system would be
extremely burdensome on the grounds that the defendants had not
shown "that it would be difficult to transport evidence, witnesses,
or attorneys" to California, and Nobelpharma attorneys were
20 6
conducting their defense.
Concerning the third factor-interference with a foreign
state's sovereignty-the dissent rejected the defendants'
contention that hearing the case in California would significantly
interfere with Sweden's authority to try disputes involving its
citizens because the case involved a California corporation and
California law. 207 The fact that the defendants had a direct
professional relationship with governmental institutions was
208
irrelevant because those ties were not involved in this litigation.
Concerning the fourth factor-California's interest in hearing the
suit-California has a strong interest in providing its citizens with
a forum for those who are injured there. 20 9 The dissent then
agreed with the majority's evaluation of the other three factors,
210
but it thought that they were not determinative.
The dissent concluded:
[T]he Swedish doctors' purposeful direction of tortious activity into
California and the state's strong concomitant interest in providing a
forum in which its residents may seek redress of their grievances
must be weighed against the burden on the Swedish doctors in
having to litigate in a foreign legal system and any possible
interference with Sweden's sovereignty. I conclude that the Swedish
doctors have failed to meet their burden requiring them to present a
compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The
Swedish Doctors purposefully directed their tortious conduct into
the forum for the purpose of harming Core-Vent. They should not
now be heard to complain that it would be unfair to require them to
defend themselves in a forum in which they intended their tortious

204. Id. at 1494 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1494-95.
207. Id. at 1495.
208. Id. (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). The dissent added that "California has
an interest in 'employing its libel laws to discourage the deception of its
citizens."' Id. (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776).
210. Id.
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conduct to have its effect. 211

Other courts that have considered the reasonableness factors
more often adopt the position of the dissent in Core-Vent, rather
than the majority analysis. 212
These courts think that the
defendants' purposeful interjection into the home state's affairs
and the interest of the forum state in protecting its residents
usually outweigh any burden on the defendants or interference
with the foreign state's sovereignty. 213 These courts point out that
"modern advances in communications and transportation have
significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another country,"
2
thus easing any burden on the defendant. 14
II. THE CRAZY HORSE LITIGATION
The marketing of the "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor" created
great controversy. 21 5 One author has written, "[flor the Lakota,
and for all Native Americans, the existence of Crazy Horse Malt
Liquor is a problem of epic proportions. 216 As another writer has
noted: "On the glass bottle in which the beer is sold there is an
image of an [sic] Native American chief in a war bonnet. Further,
the bottle is decorated with representations of Native American
bead work and a medicine wheel." 217 Although Congress passed

legislation banning the use of Crazy Horse's name "on any distilled
spirit, wine, or malt beverage product," 218 a federal court quickly
21 9
invalidated this law on First Amendment grounds.
Several prominent people have criticized the marketing of
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor. For example, in 1992, shortly after the
introduction of the malt liquor, Surgeon General Antonio C.
Novello declared that marketing the "malt liquor showed a 'lack of
211. Id.
212. E.g., Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1132-34; Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 111417; Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1998);
Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1400-02.
213. See Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114-17; Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323
(stressing the purposeful injection factor); Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1400-02. See
also Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1134 ("On balance, we conclude that [the
defendant] has not met its burden of presenting a compelling case that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial
justice.").
214. E.g., Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat'l
Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988); Dole Food, 303 F.3d at
1115.
215. Newton, supra note 2, at 1019; Herrera, supra note 2, at 177.
216. Herrera, supra note 2, at 195.
217. Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual
PropertyRights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 355, 388 (1998).
218. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act,
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 633, 106 Stat. 1729 (1992).
219. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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respect for one of the greatest chiefs and leaders of the Oglala
Sioux.' ' 220 Similarly, in letters to the defendants, South Dakota
Senators Tom Daschle and Larry Pressler argued that "defendants
Horse' for malt liquor was an affront to
use of the name 'Crazy
221
native Americans."
A. A Conflict of Cultures and Laws
The Crazy Horse Litigation involved a clash of cultures. On
the one side were Crazy Horse's descendants and tribe who were
trying to protect Crazy Horse's name. On the other side were two
Brooklyn men who were trying to live the great American,
capitalist dream.
Native Americans have long felt that they have been
mistreated in this country in a way that other minorities have not
been. 222 Nell Jessup Newton, an attorney for the plaintiffs in the
Crazy Horse litigation, has declared: "A grievance widely shared
by many Indian people in the United States is the commercial
appropriation of Indian names, images, stories, religious practices,
and patterns."223 He has further asserted:
More generally, this case is part of a multivocal, multilocal, struggle
of Indian people in the late twentieth century to destabilize the
stereotypes that make up the dominant society's image of
"Indianness" and replace these ahistorical, timeless, static, passive,
with multilayered,
images
Orientalized
decontextualized,
multipurposive, individual and collective identities224claimed by
Indian people and tribes in the late-twentieth century.
Native Americans believe that the dominant culture has
225
They object
regarded them as "nothing more than stereotypes."
to the use of their images and symbols by others as dehumanizing,
and believe they have been depicted as "objects, cartoon
226
They
characters, and animals instead of as living persons."
point out that these images have been "presented as ahistorical
Some writers have contended that this
and contextless." 227
negative image of Native Americans has negatively affected their
self-image and contributed to societal problems in their

220. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. See also Novello, supra note 2, at 21
('"This product is insensitive to the plight of the American Indian with regard
to alcohol abuse and the progress that has been made against it on
reservations.").
221. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
222. Newton, supra note 2, at 1006-09, 1012.
223. Id. at 1003.
224. Id. at 1004.
225. Id. at 1011. See also Herrera, supra note 2, at 177.
226. Newton, supranote 2, at 1009.
227. Id. at 1010.
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communities. 228 In particular, former Surgeon General Novello
has asserted, "negative stereotypes linking alcohol to the Native
American population cast a shadow over the entire Native
229
American population.1
Many Native Americans consider their cultural images to be
property. 230 They feel that their images and symbols have been
"treated as goods lying about in the public domain ready to the
hand of any entrepreneur with something to sell." 231 They are
especially upset in this case because Crazy Horse had opposed the
use of alcohol, 232 and one bottle of this malt liquor had "as much
alcohol as a six pack of beer." 233 In addition, they felt that "[t]o
associate the life of any spiritual leader for the purpose of
commercial and financial gains is insulting and offensive to the
meaning of their life." 234 They also believed that Hornell had
target marketed the malt liquor to African-American and Hispanic
men.235

The defendants were "second generation Italian Americans
from Brooklyn" who had been beer truck drivers. 236 A Hornell
lobbyist had asserted: "Their fledgling small business is their only
way of finding a release from the confines of driving beer trucks on
Brooklyn streets for the rest of their lives and achieving their
vision of a better, more independent and secure life." 237 The
defendants claimed that they had spent thousands of hours
developing their product. 238 They stated that they had chosen the
Crazy Horse name "to celebrate a great Native American Chieftain
228. Dougherty, supra note 217, at 376-77. See generally Laurel Davis,
Protest Against the Use of Native American Mascots: A Challenge to
TraditionalAmerican Identity, 17 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 14 (1993).
229. Novello, supra note 2, at 16. Dr. Novello has written that "a large
proportion of the Native American population dies before age forty-five." Id. at
15. He considers alcoholism to be a significant factor in this early death rate.
Id. at 15-16.
230. Newton, supra note 2, at 1011.
231. Id. at 1009.
232. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1099; Herrera, supra note 2, at 176 ("He
abhorred alcohol use and encouraged his people to stay away from the drug,
which he saw as the white man's tool for debilitating the Lakota."); Novello,
supra note 2, at 17 ("[M]ost disturbing was the tasteless and misleading use of
the name on this product of an Indian leader deeply opposed to alcohol use by
his people, and the reinforcement of a harmful cultural stereotype."); Crazy
Horse Defense Project, Overview: Why Does This Matter to Us?, at
http://crazyhorsedefense.org/menu2b.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) ("To use
the name and mystique of a great protector and spiritual leader to market a
product that kills so many Indians is despicable.") (emphasis omitted).
233. Newton, supra note 2, at 1023.
234. Crazy Horse Defense Project, supra note 232.
235. Newton, supra note 2, at 1025-26.
236. Id. at 1024.
237. Id.
238. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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as part of our introduction of a line of beers which commemorate
the American West and its legends." 239 According to a Wall Street
could easily bankrupt the
Journal report, "[b]anning Crazy Horse
240
jobs."
of
scores
destroy
and
company
The Crazy Horse Litigation also involved fundamental
differences in the concept of law. The American legal system is
based on a system of individual rights-rights against the
government and rights to own property against the world. In the
241
American legal system, group rights are usually unimportant.
Under this system, "cultural symbols are considered part of the
public domain and as a result are available for use in business
contexts." 242 On the other hand, the United States government
243
In
has often treated Native Americans as having group rights.
group
that
argued
has
Dougherty
Terence
addition, Professor
rights of Native Americans should be recognized in certain
Professor Dougherty has declared that "[i]t is
instances. 244
essential that a group be allowed to assert a group right when that
right cannot be subsumed within an individual or societal rights
argument." 245 He concluded:
Since Native American tribal sovereignty rests on a group rights
framework, Native American tribes must be able to use these rights
when certain aspects of their sovereignty and maintenance as viable
cultural entities are at stake. Thus I argue it is essential that
federal courts recognize group rights when the right the group
246
asserts implicates the self-preservation or survival of the group.
Because American intellectual property law protects
laws do not
individual rights, American intellectual property
247
defend Indian group cultural rights very well.
The case also involved a clash of laws. The main basis for this
lawsuit was the right of privacy, or the right of publicity as it is
sometimes called. The concept of the right of privacy is very
different under tribal law than it is under the law of the fifty
states.
Lakota custom protects the spiritual, personal, social and cultural
importance of an individual's name during his life and extends

239. Id.
240. James Bovard, The Second Murder of Crazy Horse, WALL

ST. J., Sept.

15, 1992, at A16.
241. Dougherty, supra note 217, at 361.

242. Id. at 355.
243. Id. at 363-64. Professor Dougherty has noted that American tribes are

specifically mentioned in the Constitution, they have political sovereignty, and
they have been treated as "distinct political group entities." Id. at 364.
244. Id. at 368.

245. Id. at 369.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 376.
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protection to his spirit and reputation after death.... While the
United States does not formally recognize defamation of the dead,
the tribal court may nevertheless find that the Crazy Horse name
has been defamed under customary tribal law.248

Under Lakota law, "a person's right to protect his or her name
lasts for seven generations." 249 As one writer has noted, "the tribal
causes of action are grounded in tribal tradition, custom, and
common law, and are likely quite different from available state
250
causes of action."
No American state would recognize a right to protect Crazy
Horse's name under the facts of this case.
The right of
privacy/publicity varies among the states. In recent years, many
jurisdictions have recognized the right of publicity as surviving a
person's death and descending to his or her heirs. 251 However,
most courts require that the decedent have exploited the
commercial value of the name in his or her lifetime; otherwise, the
right of publicity enters the public domain. 25 2 A few courts have
held that the right is inheritable, regardless of whether the
decedent exploited the right during his or her lifetime. 253 Still, it
is doubtful that any state would allow the right of privacy for a
person who died over one hundred years ago. It is a basic principle
of American intellectual property law that the intellectual
property right will end at some time. 25 4 As the court in Lugosi
asked, "[m]ay the remote descendants of the historic public figures
obtain damages for the unauthorized commercial use of the name
or likeness of their distinguished ancestors? If not, where is the
line to be drawn, and who should draw it?"255 While some states
have a post-mortem right of publicity statute, the maximum term
248. Herrera, supra note 2, at 187. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS
RED (1973).
249. Rob Capriccioso, Out of the Closet; Activists Snag Crazy Horse Label,
AM. INDIAN REP., Oct. 2003, at 8. Accord Crazy Horse Defense Project,
Overview: Basis of Our Lawsuit, at http://crazyhorsedefense.org/menu2d.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
250. Frank Pommersheim, "OurFederalism"in the Context of Federal Courts
and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and
Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 170 (2000).
251. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 25 (2004).
252. Id. See, e.g., Pirone v. MacMillian, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d Cir.
1990); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979).
253. E.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] person who avoids
exploitation during life is entitled to have his image protected against
exploitation after death just as much if not more than a person who exploited
his image during life.").
254. For example, under copyright law, "[c]opyright in a work created on or
after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and ...endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death." 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
255. 603 P.2d at 430.
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256
In addition, the purpose of
is 100 years after the person's death.
the right of publicity in American law is to protect the commercial
exploitation of a person's name or likeness by others so that the
owner can exploit the right-not to protect the reputation of the
257
The right of
owner or the culture of his or her descendants.
privacy, separate from its subcategory of the right of publicity,
ends with a person's death because the purpose of the right is to
protect injury to feelings. 258 The plaintiffs in this case are not
complaining that their right to exploit Crazy Horse's name has
been violated; they are claiming something that is more like a
traditional right of privacy.

B. The Crazy Horse Litigation
The defendants introduced the Crazy Horse Malt Liquor on
March 17, 1992.259 After sending several letters to Hornell
requesting that it discontinue the use of the Crazy Horse name, a
relative of Crazy Horse, Seth Big Crow, and his tribe brought suit
on August 25, 1993 in Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, which was the
domicile court of both Crazy Horse at his death and the
The plaintiffs' lawyers thought that a right of
plaintiffs. 260
publicity was the most promising ground to protect Crazy Horse's
name. 261 As one of the plaintiffs' lawyers has declared, "[t]he right
of publicity protects a person's right to exploit her name for
commercial purposes; moreover it survives the death of the
262
The estate requested a
rightholder, descending to her estate."
law remedies: an
common
and
Indian
combination of traditional
be publicized in
to
apology
a
public
misuse,
injunction against
'in a
"compensation
and
damages,
punitive
newspapers,
major
a
tobacco,
of
braid
one
manner'...
culturally appropriate
and
state
each
for
blanket
Pendleton
a
four-point
and
racehorse,
263
month in which products were sold."
The tribal court held that it had no jurisdiction over the
defendants. 26 4 Concerning personal jurisdiction, the tribal longarm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent of due
256. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8 (Michie 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,

§ 1448(G) (2004).
257. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
258. Id. at 843.
259. Crazy Horse Defense Project, Chronology: Case Chronology of Major
Events Between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Hornell Brewing Company, at
http://crazyhorsedefense.org/menu5c.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
260. Dougherty, supra note 217, at 389; Newton, supra note 2, at 1023-24;
Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; Crazy Horse Defense Project, supra note 259.
261. Newton, supra note 2, at 1046-49.
262. Id. at 1047.
263. Id. at 1048.
264. Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1089;
Newton, supra note 2, at 1048.
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process, and the tribal court follows Supreme Court precedent on
personal jurisdiction. 265 The plaintiffs' attorneys had argued that
"[t]he claim arose on the reservation, the defendant purposefully
directed conduct at the forum by committing intentional torts, and
the defendant, having marketed the product in 40 states, would
not be unduly inconvenienced by having to travel to the Rosebud
Reservation." 266 The plaintiffs used Calder v. Jones to support
their argument. 267 While the plaintiffs asserted that the key point
in Calder was that the harm had been directed at the forum, the
defendants contended that Calder was not applicable because the
malt liquor had not been marketed in South Dakota. 268 The judge
rejected the plaintiffs' argument because, in fact, the malt liquor
had not been marketed in South Dakota. 269 However, the judge
did find that tribal law recognized the right of publicity. 270
The Rosebud Supreme Court reversed, based on Calder.271
The court averred:
Because the defendants marketed the malt liquor nationally,
advertised and sold other nonalcoholic beverages on the Rosebud
reservation (the home of both Crazy Horse and the plaintiff), sent a
package of allegedly defamatory materials to the plaintiff on the
Rosebud reservation, and because the advertising label on the Crazy
Horse Malt Liquor bottle exalts and targets the Rosebud
reservation, there was enough factual justification to hale the
defendants into Rosebud Sioux Court consistent with federal due
process.272

The defendants then challenged the jurisdiction of the tribal
court in federal court in South Dakota. 273 The district court held
that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
case, but it also held that the defendants had not exhausted their
remedies in tribal court. 274 It enjoined the tribal court from
proceeding on the merits, and it remanded the case for the purpose
of an evidentiary hearing on questions of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction. 275 The tribal court, the tribal judge, and the
Crazy Horse estate appealed the district court ruling. 276 The

265. Newton, supra note 2, at 1049.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1049 n.181.
268. Id. at 1049-50.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1050.
271. Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1089-90;
Dougherty, supra note 217, at 389-90.
272. Dougherty, supra note 217, at 390.
273. Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1090;
Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96.
274. Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1090-91.
275. Id. at 1091.
276. Id.
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Eighth Circuit held that the tribal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case because the conduct "did not occur on the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation." 277 The court declared: 'The mere fact
that a member of a tribe or a tribe itself has a cultural interest in
conduct occurring outside a reservation does not create jurisdiction
of a tribal court under its powers of limited inherent
sovereignty. '278 The court also ruled that the exhaustion rule did
not apply to this case because, under the circumstances, it would
279
only cause delay.
With their recourse to tribal courts ended, the plaintiffs then
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota. 280 The defendants again moved to dismiss because
of lack of personal jurisdiction. 28' The court found jurisdiction
28 2
based on the effects test.
The court stated that the analysis of personal jurisdiction
usually requires two steps: 1) jurisdiction must satisfy the state
long-arm statute, and 2) assertion of jurisdiction must not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 28 3 However, under South Dakota's
long-arm statute, the court needs to look only at the federal due
28 4
process analysis.
In determining whether a court has jurisdiction over the
defendant upon a motion to dismiss, the court can rely on the
parties' pleadings and affidavits, rather than holding an
evidentiary hearing. 285 In this instance, "the Court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving
party," and the plaintiff must only make a prima facie showing of
288
jurisdiction.
The court first looked at the due process standard set forth in
28 7
The court emphasized that
United States Supreme Court cases.
"[tlhe inquiry is whether the defendants have directed their
activities toward residents of the forum and whether the litigation
arises out of those activities." 28 8 The court also looked at five

277. Id. at 1091-92. For a note criticizing this decision, see Christopher J.
Schneider, Note, Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court:
Denigratingthe Spirit of Crazy Horse to Restrain the Scope of Tribal Court
Jurisdiction,43 S.D. L. REV. 486 (1998).
278. Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d at 1091.
279. Id. at 1092-93.
280. Witko, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1101.
283. Id. at 1096.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1097.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1096.
288. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
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factors developed in Eighth Circuit cases: "(1) the nature and
quality of the defendants' contacts with South Dakota; (2) the
quantity of their contacts with this state; (3) the relation of the
cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of South Dakota in
providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the
parties."28 9 The court noted that it could consider the first three
factors together and that the last two factors are less important
than the first three. 290 The court thought that the effects test was
one method of evaluating the first three factors. 291 The court
declared: "[T]he effects test is a method of determining whether a
non-resident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 292
Based on the effects test, the court concluded:
Although [the defendants] have never been to South Dakota and
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor is not marketed in South Dakota,
defendants effectively have "reached into" South Dakota by using
the Crazy Horse name on liquor and proceeding to do so while
knowingly impacting the descendants of Crazy Horse who are
293
residents of South Dakota.
Based on their connections with South Dakota, the
defendants should have reasonably anticipated being sued
there. 294 The court thought this case was similar to Calder, where
the individual defendants had "'expressly aimed' their tortious
actions at a California resident knowing that the brunt of the
injury would be felt by the plaintiff in California. 295
After reviewing the Eighth Circuit cases on the effects test,
the court applied the three-part test courts often employ to
evaluate the effects test: the plaintiff must "show 'that the
defendant's acts (1) were intentional, (2) were 'uniquely' or
expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the
brunt of which was suffered-and which the defendant knew was
likely to be suffered-there."'296 The court first thought that the
defendants' conduct was intentional and "uniquely directed at
South Dakota," where Crazy Horse's descendants live. 297 His
descendants live in South Dakota on the Rosebud reservation, the
Pine Ridge Reservation, and the Cheyenne River Reservation. 298

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1101.
1099.
1100.
1099.
1098 (quoting Zumbro, 861 F. Supp. at 782-83).
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The court noted that Crazy Horse is the "beloved leader of the
Lakota Sioux," that he devoted his life to protecting his people's
cultural ways, and that he vehemently condemned the use of
alcohol by his people. 299 Crazy Horse's descendants respected his
dying wish not to disturb his mind or spirit after his death, and
they have used his name in only limited circumstances, making
certain that no one exploited his person, name, or spirit.30 0 The
court declared: "Having spent thousands of hours in research and
development of the product and its introduction into the
marketplace, the defendants had to know that their actions were
30 1
uniquely aimed at residents in South Dakota."
Similarly, the court concluded that the brunt of the harm was
suffered in South Dakota, and the defendants knew that it would
probably be felt there. 30 2 Although it might not be clear what state
Crazy Horse would be considered a citizen of, the harm was being
felt by Crazy Horse's descendants in South Dakota. 30 3 The court
declared:
The malt liquor bears the Crazy Horse name which the descendants
of Crazy Horse, residents of South Dakota, have tried to protect
from misuse pursuant to a sacred trust. The plaintiffs allege that
because of defendants' actions the descendants of Crazy Horse have
suffered a shameful slur in Lakota culture: "He (Crazy Horse) must
be without relatives who can stand up for him at a time when they
'30 4
have given his name to a liquor.
In addition, the defendants knew their actions were affecting
South Dakota residents, through the letters from South Dakota
Senators Daschle and Pressler, through a letter from counsel, and
through the prior litigation. 305 Finally, the defendants had not
argued that their conduct "was felt more significantly in a state
306
other than South Dakota."
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that, to
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff must establish
some other contact with the forum, in addition to the effects
test.307 The court noted that under the purposeful availment
analysis, the Supreme Court has permitted jurisdiction over a
defendant "whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the
'purposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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state."308
The court distinguished this case from Casualty
Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dillon.30 9 In that case,
the court had noted the importance the Supreme Court in Calder
had placed on the fact that approximately 600,000 copies of the
National Enquirer had been distributed in California. 31° Dillon
rejected personal jurisdiction over the defendants because the
plaintiff had only shown "an injurious effect in the forum, while
the effects test requires proof [1] that the defendant's actions were
uniquely aimed at the forum, [2] that the brunt of the harm was
suffered in the forum and [3] that the defendants knew it would be
suffered there."311 The court declared that harm from a "libelous
statement is not necessarily suffered in the place of
incorporation." 312 The court in Witko distinguished its facts from
those in Dillon on the ground that all elements of the effects test
had been satisfied. 313 In other words, there was more than an
injurious effect in the forum; the brunt of the harm had been felt
there.
The court also considered the second half of the due process
test: "Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with
'fair play and substantial justice."' 314 When the first half of the
due process test has been satisfied, the defendant "must present a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations
would render jurisdiction unreasonable." 31 5 Among the factors
that a court looks at are "the interest of the forum state in
providing a forum for its residents" and "the convenience of the
parties." 31 6
The defendants had asserted that it was not
convenient to have the case tried in South Dakota. 317 However,
the court declared it "finds that the inconvenience to defendants is
outweighed by the extent of the defendants' purposeful interjection
into the affairs of residents of South Dakota, by South Dakota's
interest in adjudicating the dispute and by the efficiency of
hearing the entire case in one forum."31 8

308. Id. at 1100-01.
309. Id. (citing Cas. Assurance Risk Ins. Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d
596 (9th Cir. 1992)).
310. Id. at 1101.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77).
315. Id. at 1101-02.
316. Id. at 1101 (quoting Guinness Import Co. v. Mark VII Distrib. Co., 153
F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1998)).
317. Id. at 1102.
318. Id.
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Following the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss for lack
3 19
of personal jurisdiction, the case was scheduled for trial.
320
However, the parties have since settled the case.
III.

THE BOUNDARY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Evaluationof the Supreme Court'sApproach to Personal
Jurisdictionand a Proposalfor a Minimal ConstraintsTest of
PersonalJurisdiction Under the Due Process Clause
The boundary of personal jurisdiction should prevent states
from asserting jurisdiction over defendants who have no
significant connection with the state, yet permit broad jurisdiction
so that plaintiffs have the opportunity to litigate their grievances.
The Due Process Clause guards individuals' liberty interests 32 1 -in
other words, it prohibits a state from asserting jurisdiction over an
individual that has no connection or a weak connection with that
state, or when assertion of jurisdiction would be unfair to the
defendant because the defendant cannot mount a proper defense
to the suit. On the other hand, when personal jurisdiction is
limited too much, a plaintiffs rights are infringed; the plaintiff
may not be able to litigate the claim, or the litigation may become
unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the way to balance the rights of
defendants and plaintiffs is by having minimal due process
constraints on personal jurisdiction that are based on a state's
322
power over an individual grounded in territory and fairness.
319. Capriccioso, supra note 249, at 8.
320. Crazy Horse Case Finally Dismissed; Use of Brandname-Breweries,
MODERN BREWERY AGE, Jan. 19, 2004, at 1.
321. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 n.13)
("The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no
meaningful 'contacts, ties or relations."'). But see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin,
Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 516 (1987) ('The right to be free from
litigation in a state in which one has not purposefully connected oneself does
not seem to be one of those obvious fundamental rights 'valued by sensible
men."') (citation omitted).
322. Others who have proposed a minimal constraints test for due process
include Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of PersonalJurisdiction,
68 MO. L. REV. 753, 795-802 (2003); Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest"
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction,35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 955 (2000)
("mhe constitutional limitation on state court assertions of personal
jurisdiction would be the same as for choice--of-law determinations."); Stephen
Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and
HistoricalPerspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 965, 994-97 (1995) (advocating use of the English model); Russell J.
Weintraub, A Map Out of the PersonalJurisdictionLabyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 531, 545-50 (1995). See also Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional
Pragmatism:International Shoe's Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
561, 564 (1995) [hereinafter Borchers, JurisdictionalPragmatism] ("[Tihe Due
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The most important aspect of personal jurisdiction is
territorial-has the defendant performed some act that has
brought him or her within the state's sovereign power based on its
territory? 323
Although International Shoe rejected the strict

Process Clause places almost no limitations on personal jurisdiction.");
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 769, 839-44 (1995); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to
Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1994) (questioning
whether personal jurisdiction should be grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment). Professor McFarland has recently proposed a due process test
that is broader and narrower than the current Supreme Court test.
McFarland, supra, at 795-802. He proposes that personal jurisdiction be
based on "an intentional transactional entry." Id. at 796. "The defendant
must know, or be substantially certain, that its actions will pierce the borders
of the forum state." Id. He also rejects the concept of general jurisdiction and
any consideration of reasonableness. Id. at 797-98. His approach differs from
the approach proposed here in that I still retain general jurisdiction and a
minimal constraint on reasonableness. His test resembles my first prong,
although there are differences because our analyses of some cases differ. For
example, he would find jurisdiction in Hanson (he is not specific as to why)
and Asahi, and I would not. See id. at 807. I reject personal jurisdiction in
Hanson because I do not think that the trustee made a purposeful connection
with the forum. I reject personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Asahi
because California's regulatory authority does not extend to an indemnity
action by a Taiwanese manufacturer against a Japanese manufacturer
concerning the sale of parts that took place outside California after the
underlying claims have been dismissed.
California would have had
jurisdiction over the component manufacturer if the claim had concerned the
'injury in California because California has regulatory authority over injuries
that occur there.
323. Professor Rutherglen has identified two strands that have appeared in
academic analyses of International Shoe: The first is based on "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice' as the test for jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause," and the second "takes the standard of 'minimum
contacts' at face value, emphasizing territorial limitations on state power."
Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 360-61. This Article stresses the territorial
aspects of jurisdiction, although it does consider fairness to a limited extent in
the second prong of this author's proposed test of personal jurisdiction. Other
scholars who have advocated territory as the basis of jurisdiction include
McFarland, supra note 322, at 790-794 ("State boundaries matter."); Allan R.
Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 383 (1985)
("[Tierritorial limitations on state court jurisdiction may be deduced from
general federalism-related territorial limitations on state sovereignty.");
Mollie A. Murphy, PersonalJurisdictionand the Stream of Commerce Theory:
A Reappraisaland a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 290-92 (1989). "[Tjhe
existence of sovereignty limitations on a state's authority to assert jurisdiction
is readily supported whether on the basis of structural considerations or the
due process clause itself." Julia Christine Bunting, 47 VAND. L. REV. 189, 221
n.182 (1994). See also Lea Brilmayer, Introduction: Three PerennialThemes
in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 561, 561-64 (1991).
However, other authors have rejected territory as a basis of personal
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territorial rules of Pennoyer v. Neff3 24 in favor of a fairness inquiry,
the Supreme Court still based that fairness inquiry on territory-a
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'3 25 The Due Process Clause
dictates this result. 326 The Due Process Clause is about the
relationship of the state and the individual. 327 Since a state is
defined by its territory, 328 a state cannot assert its sovereignty
over an individual when that individual has no connection with
the territory of that state. As Professor Lea Brilmayer has noted,
personal jurisdiction implicates an "individual's right to be left
alone."

32 9

jurisdiction, instead emphasizing the fairness of the forum. E.g., Jack B.
Weinstein, American Conflicts Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Panel
PresentationsMass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational
World Communicating by ExtraterrestrialSatellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
145, 146 (2001); Perdue, supra note 321, at 479, 509-10; Harold S. Lewis, Jr.,
The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudenceof PersonalJurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 727-28,
732-34 (1983).
324. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
325. Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
326. Just because strict territorial rules do not work does not mean that we
should reject more flexible ones.
327. The Court has occasionally phrased the due process inquiry in terms of
interstate federalism. For example, World-Wide Volkswagen stated:
The Framers... intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to
try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn,
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States-a
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
444 U.S. at 293. This statement is obviously wrong because the Due Process
Clause has nothing to do with the relationship of the states. The Court later
recognized this in Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982), where it noted, the due process clause "is the
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns." See also Perdue, supra note 321, at
514 ("[I]t simply makes no sense to turn the fourteenth amendment from a
provision protecting citizens from states into a provision protecting states from
other states."); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdictionand
the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional
Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 948 (1995) ("Concerns of interstate
federalism upon which the purposeful availment requirement has traditionally
been premised simply have no textual, historical, or theoretical connection to
the Due Process Clause.").
328. Weisburd, supra note 323, at 383 ("[S]tate sovereignty, as a matter of
law, is limited territorially."); Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal
Jurisdiction,60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5, 18 (1989).
329. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 270-71 (1995).

See also Stewart,

supra note 328, at 18 ("The state's lack of authority simply reflects the
defendant's right to be free from certain assertions of such authority-his
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Territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction do not require
that the defendant have acted within the state's boundaries, only
that the consequences of the act be felt within the state. As
Professor Stein has pointed out, "in order to protect persons and
property within its borders, a state must have the authority to
regulate beyond its borders." 330 The Supreme Court does not
dictate that a defendant "physically enter the forum state," only
that the defendant "purposefully directed" its efforts at the forum
state.331 Such pragmatic territorialism recognizes the importance
of physical borders as well as the realities of modern life, where
occurrences or transactions can take place in more than one state.
While the Supreme Court has allowed jurisdiction by a state
over defendants who acted outside that state, it has unduly
restricted that jurisdiction through its foreseeability requirements
in cases like World-Wide Volkswagen, 33 2 Burger King,33 3 and
Asahi.334 Although the completely unilateral activity of another
right to be, and to be treated as, unconnected.").
330. Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to
Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373, 376 (2001).
331. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 476.
332. 444 U.S. at 298.
333. 471 U.S. at 474.
334. 480 U.S. at 110-20. Professor Heiser has written: "For reasons that
have never been explained, however, the Supreme Court has instead adopted
a more intrusive role in this area [personal jurisdiction] than, for example, in
such areas as choice-of-law, service of process, and procedural or substantive
due process generally." Heiser, supra note 322, at 916. Other scholars who
have criticized the Supreme Court standard of foreseeability include
McFarland, supra note 322, at 808-09; Diane S. Kaplan, Paddling up the
Wrong Stream: Why the Stream of Commerce Theory is Not Part of the
Minimum Contacts Doctrine, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2003); Bruce Posnak,
The Court Doesn't Know Its Asahi from Its Wortman: A Critical View of
ConstitutionalConstraintsof Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 875, 889 (1990) ("If defendant manufacturer does not directly or
indirectly sell in the forum state, there will be no jurisdiction."). See also
Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling
Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 102 (1988) ("[D]efendants
simply do not need all of the constitutional protection from plaintiffs choice of
forum that the Supreme Court keeps lavishing on them."). But see Christine
M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent of JurisdictionalPrivity,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 424-37 (1993) (agreeing with the reasoning in WorldWide Volkswagen but criticizing Asahi.).
Professor Kaplan has advocated a basis for stream of commerce jurisdiction
that is separate from the normal minimum contacts analysis:
Lack of control, knowledge, or awareness of a product's route does not
mean, however, that the stream participant's conduct is jurisdictionally
insignificant.
To the contrary, component part manufacturers
purposefully participate in networks that connect to other networks in
order to access distant markets. In fact, a component manufacturer
without a network of other manufacturers, sellers, and distributors
would be a jurisdictional nonstarter since it has no independent access
to consumer markets.
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should not permit jurisdiction over a defendant, 335 almost any act
by the defendant that the defendant knows or should know might
harm a plaintiff in the forum should create jurisdiction. However,
the Supreme Court standard is much narrower. As stated earlier,
the Supreme Court has required that
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
336
haled into court there.
It has further refined that requirement: the defendant's
activities must "be more purposefully directed at the forum State
than the mere act of placing a product in the stream of
commerce." 337 The Court elaborated:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum state, .. . advertising in
the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice
to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum
State. But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce
may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert
the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
338
purposefully directed toward the forum State.
This standard is too narrow; purposefully directed is a useful
term, but it has been applied too narrowly. A state should have
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who places an item in the
stream of commerce when the defendant knows or should know
that the item will enter the forum and the defendant derives some
benefit from the item being in the forum, such as sales in that
state. The important fact is that a defendant has knowingly
benefited from a state's market; further conduct, such as
advertising in a state or having sales agents in a state, should not
be required. Thus, when a manufacturer sells a component part,
such as a tire valve, to another manufacturer who uses that part
in a finished item, such as a tire, and it causes injury in the forum,
the court should have jurisdiction over the component part
manufacturer as long as the first manufacturer knew or should
have known that the second manufacturer sold tires in the forum,
nationwide, or worldwide. While it was the act of the second
manufacturer that brought the tire into the forum, the first

Kaplan, supra,at 591.
335. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 474.
336. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
337. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110.
338. Id. at 112.
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manufacturer knowingly benefited from the sale. 339 Accordingly, it
does not violate due process to assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
The situation would be different if none of the connections
with the forum state were created by the defendant. Say, a
manufacturer sells DES, a drug known to cause vaginal cancer in
women, 340 only in California. A woman bought and used the
manufacturer's DES in California. Later, she moved to New York
and develops vaginal cancer. Despite the fact that the harm was
felt in New York, she should not be able to sue in New York
because all the New York connections were created by the
plaintiff. Similarly, if a Nevada resident buys a power saw in
Nevada and lends it to a friend in Utah who is injured there by a
defect in that power saw, a Utah court should not have jurisdiction
over the Maine manufacturer who does not sell the item in Utah
and has no connections to that state.
Although fairness should be part of the due process
evaluation, the factors the Court normally looks at under this
part-(1) "the burden on the defendant," (2) "the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute," (3) "the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief," (4) "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies," and (5) the "shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies" 341-have
little to do with due process protections for defendants. 342 The last
339. Professor Wiseman has remarked that the plurality analysis in Asahi is
"troublesome because it effectively abrogates a right of action for many
products liability plaintiffs against component part manufacturers."
Wiseman, supra note 334, at 434. Later, she added:
By infusing the requirement of jurisdictional privity into a plaintiffs
ability to sue directly a component part manufacturer, a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court has allowed the component part
manufacturer to effectively immunize itself from suit by an injured
plaintiff--even in those situations where it is the only solvent source of
relief.
Id. at 443.
340. Diethylstilbestrol ("DES") is "a synthetic nonsteroidal substance having
estrogenic properties and once used to treat menstrual disorders. It is no
longer used due to the incidence of certain vaginal cancers in the daughters of
women so treated."

AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

(2002), http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=DES

(last visited Mar. 5,

2005).
341. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 292). Accord Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16.
342. Others who have criticized the Court's reasonableness test include
Heiser, supra note 322, at 925-28 ('The main criticism is that the Supreme
Court has provided little guidance as to what these factors mean, beyond that
they serve the purpose of assisting the courts to achieve 'fair play and
substantial justice."'); Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers"for International Shoe
(and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International
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four factors have nothing to do with protecting the defendant from
overreaching by the state-rather they are like forum non
conveniens considerations. Only the first factor-the burden on
the defendant-is relevant to fairness, and this factor should be
part of the due process inquiry only when the burden of defending
in a forum is so great that the defendant cannot mount an effective
defense. The Due Process Clause does not protect from mere
inconvenience.
Finally, the current Supreme Court test of personal
jurisdiction is often hard to apply, causing great variation in lower
courts' applications of the test and even variations within the
Supreme Court's application. 343 It seems that each federal court of
appeals and state supreme court has its own view of personal
344
Such differences create
jurisdiction under International Shoe.
uncertainty in our legal system, and it has generated thousands of
345
personal jurisdictional challenges in trial courts.
Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 758-61 (1995); Linda Silberman, Reflections
on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules Jurisdictionand
Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 581 (1991) ('The
addition of a separate 'reasonableness' criterion.., tends to suggest a freeform 'fairness' inquiry where additional criteria such as choice of law, over-all
convenience, and specific individual characteristics might be considered.");
Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 804-05 (1988) ("[The current test
attempts to factor into the equation every element that has ever been deemed
relevant to jurisdictional analysis."); Posnak, supra note 334, at 887-88, 89195; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court
Jurisdiction: A Historical-InterpretiveReexamination of the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 843-46 (1981)
("[T]o the extent that it imposes a balancing test as the measure of whether
the forum is an 'unreasonably' burdensome place for trial, it is essentially
unprincipled.").
343. McFarland, supra note 322, at 767-78, 781-90. (asserting that the
InternationalShoe test "guarantees that each case will turn on what one judge
thinks fair"). See also Heiser, supra note 322, at 916 ('The current doctrine
lacks coherence and is, therefore, unpredictable."); Sheehan, supra note 1, at
393-94 ("[The Court] cannot agree on an articulation of rules or standards to
apply to decide future cases, even when the need for a clear statement of such
rules is the explicit purpose for accepting review of a given case.'). Professor
McFarland has added: "The problem is of course that the Supreme Court, and
other courts under its mandate, are trying to define the undefinable. When is
personal jurisdiction in a singular case consistent with 'fair play and
substantial justice?"' McFarland, supra note 322, at 778.
344. McFarland, supra note 322, at 781-90.
345. Id. at 769 ("Mhe Supreme Court has eliminated its 'torrent' of once-ayear decisions by requiring lower courts to decide thousands of cases
annually."); id. at 796. See also Heiser, supra note 322, at 916; Weintraub,
supra note 322, at 531 ("[Tlhe threshold determination of personal jurisdiction
has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal courts."). But
see Erwin Chemerinski, Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors
Cameron and Johnson, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 863, 865-68 (1995).
"[U]ncertainty in the law of personal jurisdiction is inevitable and desirable."

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:381

Minimal constraints on personal jurisdiction that are based
on territory and fairness would both protect defendants from
overreaching by states and allow plaintiffs to pursue their
claims. 346 While this author agrees with the Supreme Court that
due process constraints on personal jurisdiction involve both
territorial and fairness considerations, this author evaluates these
factors differently. The proper test for personal jurisdiction under
due process should be the following: 1) Does the defendant have a
significant, purposeful contact or connection with the forum or has
the defendant knowingly received some benefit from the forum
state in connection with the forum's regulatory authority? 2) If so,
is defending the lawsuit in the forum so burdensome that the
defendant cannot mount a proper defense?
This test is based on both substantive and procedural due
process evaluations of personal jurisdiction. Although no court
has ever considered due process in this manner in connection with
personal jurisdiction, 347 there are two types of due process
inquiries: substantive due process and procedural due process. 348
Substantive due process considers whether the substance of a law
is constitutional, while procedural due process asks whether the
judicial process is fair when direct impairment of life, liberty, or
property is involved. 349 Substantive due process restricts the
power of government, limiting a state's ability to interfere with an
individual's liberty. 350
It is "a check on the content of

Id. at 866.
346. For a discussion on the proper basis of personal jurisdiction in
connection with class actions and mass torts, see Scott Fruehwald, Judge
Weinstein on Personal Jurisdictionin Mass Tort Cases: A Critique, 70 TENN.
L. REV. 1047, 1087-93 (2003).
347. Professor Redish has declared: "By shaping jurisdictional doctrine
without reference to the terms, policies or history of the due process clause,
the Court has imposed limitations on state authority wholly unwarranted by
constitutional principles."
Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and
PersonalJurisdiction:Due Process and Constitutional Theory after Burnham
v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 675-76 (1991).
348. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.6,
at 374-75 (6th ed. 2000); see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 968, at 254
(1985); EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A

MULTILATERALIST METHOD 72-73 (2001) (applying these concepts to choice of
law); Borchers, JurisdictionalPragmatism,supra note 322, at 576.
349. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 348, § 10.6, at 374-75.
350. James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive
Due Process, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 96, 114 (1996). Professor Van Detta
has noted that in the eighteenth century, "the concept of personal liberty was
called the preservative of all other rights."
Jeffrey A. Van Detta,
ConstitutionalizingRoe, Casey, and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process AntiDiscrimination Principle that Gives Constitutional Content to the "Undue
Burden" Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Regulation, 10 S.
CAL. REV. L & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 237 (2001). He added: 'The true concept

of personal liberty in the eighteenth century was that the individual should be
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legislation." 351 The degree of scrutiny that a court applies in a
substantive due process inquiry depends on whether the law
involves an economic or social right or a fundamental right. A
court applies a rational basis test when an economic or social right
is involved: a law satisfies due process as long as the law "bears a
reasonable relation to the State's legitimate purpose" in enacting
the law. 352 "Although rational basis review is deferential, it is not
a mere formality." 353 On the other hand, when a fundamental
right is involved, a court should apply a strict scrutiny test: A
government may regulate fundamental rights only for a
be narrowly
compelling state interest, and such regulations must
354
interest.
state
compelling
that
further
to
tailored
In contrast, procedural due process determines only whether
the decision-making process is fair. 355 Procedural due process
protects rights like the right to be heard and the right to receive
356
notice.
Substantive due process supports the first half of the
proposed test-does the defendant have a significant, purposeful
contact or connection with the forum or has the defendant
knowingly received some benefit from the forum state in
Because
connection with the forum's regulatory authority?
to
(sovereignty)
power
state's
a
limits
process
due
substantive
assert
to
ability
state's
a
limits
it
liberty,
individual's
restrict an
personal jurisdiction through its long-arm statute over an
individual with whom it has either no connection or a tenuous
connection. 357 However, because personal jurisdiction does not
8
involve a fundamental right, 35 this limitation should be minimal.
free to act in recognized areas of personal conduct without government
coercion." Id. at 237-38.
351. Hilliard, supra note 350, at 95.
352. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978). Accord
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
353. Hilliard, supra note 350, at 106.
354. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973).
355. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 348, § 10.6, at 374-75.
356. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 902 (2004); 16C C.J.S.
ConstitutionalLaw § 968 (1985).
357. Professor Weisburd points out that a state's assertion of jurisdiction
over a defendant "is more than an effort to provide a forum for dispute
resolution; it is an exercise of governmental power. Assertions of jurisdiction,
therefore, must be subject to the same limitations that exist for exercises of
government power generally." Weisburd, supra note 323, at 385. See also
Murphy, supra note 323, at 291 ("When a state asserts jurisdiction over a
nonresident in excess of its sovereign power it acts without authority and,
thus, in violation of defendant's due process interests.").
358. As Professor Hilliard has noted, "the Court is disinclined to discover
new fundamental rights in the Due Process Clause." Hilliard, supra note 350,
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Any act by which the defendant purposefully creates a connection
with a state or knowingly derives a benefit from a state that is
connected with that state's regulatory authority establishes a
rational basis for the state to apply its long-arm statute to the
dispute. The constitutionality of requiring a defendant to defend
an action in a state with which he or she has purposefully created
a connection should be obvious. A state is not interfering with an
individual's liberty to be free from governmental interference
when that individual has intentionally created a relationship with
that state. The individual has reached into the state, not the other
way around. A state has a right to govern conduct in its territory
or conduct that affects its territory. The second half of this factor
allows a state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who has
knowingly derived a benefit from a state. This half is broader
than the current Supreme Court test of foreseeability, which
requires that there be more than an awareness that a product
might be brought into a state or that an injury might occur in a
state. 359 However, it is hard to argue that a defendant's minimal
due process rights have been violated by having jurisdiction
asserted over it when the defendant has knowingly derived a
benefit from a state. 360 In such an instance, it is not the unilateral
act of another that has created jurisdiction; it is the defendant's
own conduct. Only when the defendant had no control over the
product being in the state or the harm caused in the state should
jurisdiction be unconstitutional. In addition, a defendant should
not be able to hide behind a sophisticated marketing scheme or
some other ruse to prevent jurisdiction. As long as the defendant
knows or should know that a product will be brought into a state
and defendant benefits from marketing there or knows or should
know that harm from the defendant's conduct might occur there,
there is a rational basis for a state to extend its long-arm statute
to the matter. Thus, a court should have jurisdiction in a products
liability suit when an independent distributor brings the product
into the state, as long as the defendant knew or should have
known that the product could end up there and it benefits from the
market.
On the other hand, these minimal constraints are still
important to the protection of liberty under due process. Such
at 107.
359. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
360. Professor Kaplan has written:
[I]t is more accurate to say that minimum contacts jurisdiction is based
on a reciprocal relationship of mutual obligations and benefits as
between the defendant and the forum; in essence, a quid pro quo of
constitutional significance. The defendant's receipt of benefits from its
purposeful forum-related activities justifies the state's authority to
adjudicate claims against that defendant based on those activities.
Kaplan, supra note 334, at 579.
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minimal constraints serve as a limitation on sovereignty-a state
should not be able to assert jurisdiction over an individual who is
not within its territory or who has not made some connection with
that territory through a purposeful act. 361 In such a case, the state
lacks a rational basis for applying its long-arm statute to the
defendant.
Accordingly, the rational basis for applying a state's long-arm
statute to a situation must relate to the defendant's actions-not
an action by another person or entity or the existence of a state
interest. For example, Professor Weintraub has proposed "due
process as requiring only that the forum have some rational basis
for wishing to decide the case-either because the plaintiff resides
in the forum state or because the defendant acted or caused
consequences there, or both."362 This author disagrees with the
first half of that proposal. A state should not have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant solely because the plaintiff resides
there. A state may have an interest in protecting its citizens, but
this interest is not enough to permit jurisdiction over a defendant
who had no connection to that state. Such a rule would allow
California to have personal jurisdiction in a case involving a traffic
accident in New York between a California plaintiff and a New
York defendant who has never left the state or established ties
outside the state (assuming the defendant is not seriously
inconvenienced). Similarly, a California citizen could go to New
York and enter into a partnership there with a New York citizen
with all the partnership business being in New York, and force
that New York citizen to litigate a dispute concerning the
partnership in California. While this author believes that due
process constraints on personal jurisdiction should be minimal,
these examples go beyond the proper boundary of personal
jurisdiction.
Professor Borchers also uses a rational basis test in
connection with personal jurisdiction that this author thinks goes
too far.363 He has stated that "the rational basis test is a weak
check on state court jurisdiction. '364 "[A]s long as the state
361. Professor Wiseman has written, "jurisdiction is really nothing more
than governmental power and authority-quite literally, the power to declare
the law." Wiseman, supra note 334, at 406.
362. Weintraub, supra note 322, at 545. He added that easy transfer should
be allowed "if the defendant makes a cogent showing of unfairness in
plaintiffs chosen forum." Id. "The two factors most likely to make suit in an
interested forum unfair to the defendant are the forum's choice-of-law rule and
serious inconvenience to the defendant." Id. at 546. It is unclear how often
these fairness factors would be applied. However, this author maintains that
jurisdiction should never be proper based solely on a plaintiffs citizenship in a
state.
363. Borchers, JurisdictionalPragmatism,supra note 322, at 577-78.
364. Id. at 577.
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advances a legitimate goal in a not-irrational manner, substantive
due process demands no more." 365 Based on this standard, he
believes that assertion of jurisdiction in every Supreme Court case
since International Shoe is rational.3 66 I cannot agree with this
approach. The key should be the individual's connection to the
jurisdiction, not the state's legitimate goal in hearing the case.
For example, I believe that jurisdiction was not proper in Kulko, a
case involving child support in California against an out-of-state
father. 367 Professor Borchers would allow jurisdiction in California
because taking "jurisdiction was a rational manner of advancing
the legitimate goal of protecting the child-support rights of two
children then living in California." 368 I would reject jurisdiction
because the father had not made any purposeful connection with
the state or derived any benefit from the state in connection with
its regulatory authority.
The second half of the personal jurisdiction due process testwhether defending the lawsuit in the forum is so burdensome that
the defendant cannot mount a proper defense-involves
procedural due process, fairness in adjudication.3 69 Only when
litigating a lawsuit in a forum is so burdensome that the
defendant cannot mount a proper defense is procedural due
process violated. Mere cost or inconvenience should not prevent
jurisdiction when a defendant has purposefully created ties with
the forum.
In the modern world, this factor will be implicated only
rarely. As the Court has noted, modern means of transportation
and communication have made litigating in a distant forum less
burdensome. 370 One can travel by plane in a few hours to almost
anywhere in the world. Communications by phone, fax, and e-mail
are almost instantaneous to even the most remote parts of the
globe. Defendants can hire local counsel who understand the
forum law and who can handle most of the litigation. Only when
an individual's or company's resources are so limited that they
cannot present an effective defense should a case be dismissed
under this factor.

365. Id.
366. Id. at 577-78.
367. 436 U.S. at 84.
368. Borchers, JurisdictionalPragmatism,supra note 322, at 578.
369. Others who agree with this view include Heiser, supra note 322, at 93435; Goldstein, supra note 322, at 985 ("[E]ight of the nine Justices... accepted
the view of Justices Stevens and White in the Burger King case that the
Supreme Court should invalidate state assertions of personal jurisdiction if, on
the particular facts of the case before it, a majority of the Justices found the
assertion of jurisdiction to be 'unfair.'
What an usurpation of state
discretion!"); Whitten, supra note 342, at 843-45. See also Weinstein, supra
note 323, at 146.
370. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
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This should also apply to foreign defendants; a defendant
should not be able to complain that it is unfair to defend in a
foreign country when that defendant has made some purposeful
connection with that foreign country, purposefully caused harm in
that foreign country, or derived a benefit from that foreign
country's markets. This is contrary to Asahi, which held that
"[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in
a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing
the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders." 371 However, the defendant in
Asahi could have countered these difficulties by hiring California
counsel who knew California law. The defendant was apparently
a large corporation that had not claimed that it lacked the funds to
372
litigate in California.
While a plaintiffs interest in the jurisdictional inquiry has
played only a small part in Supreme Court personal jurisdiction
cases (appearing as a factor in the reasonableness inquiry), the
plaintiffs interest in the lawsuit should not be ignored. Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, a plaintiff
has a property right in its lawsuit. 373 However, if a state lacks
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that state cannot assert
jurisdiction over that defendant, even if the plaintiff has no access
to any court in which to vindicate its claims. A defendant's right
to be free of the power of a state with which it has no connection or
only tenuous connections should be absolute. Thus, the only way
to respect both plaintiffs and defendant's rights is through
minimal due process constraints on personal jurisdiction, such as
the test suggested above. In such an instance, the plaintiffs due
process interest in bringing a lawsuit in a jurisdiction will be
cases-when a defendant has
foreclosed only in a small number of
374
no significant connection to a state.
371. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
372. The tire manufacturer had "incorporated into its tire tubes 150,000
Asahi valve assemblies in 1978; 500,000 in 1979... and 1980; 100,000 in
1981 ...and 1982." Id. at 106. "These sales comprised 1.24 percent of Asahi's
income in 1981 and 0.44 in 1982." Id.
373. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) ("[A]
cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 281-82 (1980) (declaring that "[a]rguably," a state tort claim "is a species
of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause."); R. D. Rees, Note, Plaintiff
Due Process Rights in Assertions of PersonalJurisdiction, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
405, 409 (2003) ("[Under current, uncontroverted Supreme Court doctrine, a
potential plaintiff has a property right to a cause of action.").
374. Mr. Rees has proposed a balancing test of plaintiff's and defendant's
interests in the due process inquiry. Rees, supra note 373, at 433-34. He has
asserted: "A balancing test imposing jurisdiction in the face of strong plaintiff
contacts and slightly less than what now might be considered defendant
minimum contacts should not offend the Constitution." Id. at 433. I reject a
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B. Evaluationof Calder and the Effects Test
Calder expanded jurisdiction in a way that both respects a
defendant's due process rights and allows plaintiffs to assert their
claims. When a reporter and an editor commit defamation in one
state, knowing that it will cause harm in another state where the
plaintiff lives, they should be subject to jurisdiction in the state
where the harm was caused. The fact that the reporters had no
economic stake in the magazine and they did not distribute it in
California is irrelevant; they knew that the harm would occur in
California, and they intended that it would take place there. This
satisfies even the Supreme Court's narrow view of foreseeability 375
because the harm was targeted at the forum state. Surely, such
defendants cannot reasonably argue that they did not have fair
warning that they would be haled into the courts of a state in
which they intended harm. Due process protects an individual
from a forum state's overreaching when the individual has not
established any connection with the forum; it is not a "shield"
based on strict territorial rules.
Consider the three-part test that lower courts have used to
evaluate the effects test:
1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; 2) The plaintiff felt
the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can be said
to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result
of the tort; 3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at
the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the
376
tortious activity.
This author agrees with the first factor, but believes that the
second and third factors should be broader than they have been
applied by many courts. Jurisdiction should be allowed when
there is significant harm in the forum state, rather than limiting
jurisdiction to when the brunt of the harm is in the forum state.
Similarly, jurisdiction should exist when the conduct is
intentionally targeted at the forum state; requiring that the forum
state be the focal point is unnecessarily limiting. These two
changes would allow for broader jurisdiction than many cases have
permitted under the effects test. 377
balancing test because, as stated in the text, I believe that a defendant has a
minimal due process right against assertions of jurisdiction that is absolute.
However, the results under my minimal constraints standard and Mr. Rees's
balancing test might be similar. He does add that "because liberty interests
are generally thought to have more significance than property interests, the
burden of persuasion could rest with the plaintiff." Id. at 434.
375. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-73; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at 297-98.

376. Rosenstein, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 273.

See also supra note 63 and

accompanying text.
377. One author has expressed concerns that lower courts have interpreted
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First, limiting jurisdiction to intentional torts and similar
causes of action under the effects test comports with due process
requirements because this factor establishes a knowing connection
with the forum by the defendant; jurisdiction has been established
by the defendant, not the unilateral act of the plaintiff or a third
party. The lack of a physical connection with the forum is
irrelevant. There should be no difference between harm caused
intentionally within a state and conduct outside a state that is
intended to cause harm within a state.
All the intentional torts and similar acts used by courts under
the effects test--defamation, fraud, business torts, trademark,
violations of consumer protection acts, etc.--contain the necessary
element of intent and satisfy due process considerations, as long as
the other parts of the effects test are satisfied. Libel, fraud, and
violations of consumer protection acts usually injure individuals
where they reside. Likewise, trademark violations and business
torts often injure a corporation at its principal place of business.
Commanding that the brunt of the harm be felt in the forum
state is more than due process compels. Requiring that there be
significant injury in the forum state should be enough. First, as
one judge has pointed out, Calder does not mandate that the brunt
of the harm be in the forum state;3 78 rather this is a factor
supporting jurisdiction.3 79 Second, the key factors should be
knowledge that the harm will occur or will probably occur in the
forum and the intention that it happen there. Finally, as noted
3 80
previously, jurisdiction is often proper in more than one state.
The fact that there is more harm in State One than in State Two
should not make jurisdiction unconstitutional in State Two when
there is still significant harm in State Two. This will also alleviate
the difficulty of locating the state where the brunt of the harm
occurred.
Take the example of someone who intentionally releases an
internet worm that causes harm worldwide.3 8 1 Although the
"inventor," who lives in Iowa, does not know where harm might
occur, he intentionally released the worm, and he should know
that the worm could cause harm anywhere. Assume that the
worm, in addition to producing havoc worldwide, causes $50,000 in
Calder too broadly, allowing jurisdiction in almost all cases involving the
plaintiffs home state. See generally, Laura S. Ferster, Recent Decisions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court: Griffis v. Luban. A Red Herringin the High Seas of
Personal Jurisdiction, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343 (2002). However, as
noted throughout this Article, this author believes that broad jurisdiction is
appropriate in our modern society because it allows plaintiffs to adjudicate
their grievances as fully as possible.
378. Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1492 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
379. Calder,465 U.S. at 789-90.
380. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
381. This hypothetical is based on Sheehan, supra note 1, at 431-32.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:381

damages to a computer in Maine. Should the inventor escape
jurisdiction in Maine because the brunt of the harm was not felt
there? This author believes that jurisdiction should be proper in
Maine. Such jurisdiction should satisfy due process because the
inventor intentionally created a connection with Maine by his
intentional act, thus giving Maine a rational basis to assert its
sovereignty over the inventor.
On the other hand, jurisdiction under the effects test should
not be proper where a minimal amount of harm happened; a
defendant should not be subject to jurisdiction in an unlimited
number of forums with weak connections to the defendant's
conduct. Since significant harm usually occurs with intentional
torts in the state where the plaintiff resides, this limitation should
not be unfair to plaintiffs.
Jurisdiction over the defendant in a libel case should be
proper in plaintiffs home state when significant harm is felt by
the plaintiff in his or her home state. In such a case, the
defendant has purposefully made a connection with the state,
thereby satisfying due process requirements. The fact that harm,
even the majority of the harm, is felt elsewhere is irrelevant. The
same should be true of other intentional conduct out of state that
creates significant harm in the plaintiffs home state, including
fraud, violation of consumer protection acts, etc.
The situation is harder with corporations, especially when
trademark infringement or business torts are involved. Where
does an entity like a corporation feel harm? The key questions
should be the following: Did the corporation feel the harm at its
principal place of business? Did the corporation suffer lost profits,
did it lose a tax break, or was its value otherwise damaged by a
knowing act of the defendant? In other words, was the value of its
stock materially affected? If so, there should be enough harm to
allow jurisdiction in the state of the corporation's principal place of
business.
The targeting requirement protects both defendants and
plaintiffs. A defendant will not be subject to jurisdiction unless
that defendant targeted the forum in some way. On the other
hand, if the defendant has targeted the plaintiff in the forum, the
plaintiff will not have to seek out the defendant at its home. While
mere foreseeability of harm occurring in the forum may not be
enough to establish jurisdiction, the intention that harm occur
there should be enough, even under the Supreme Court's narrow
view of foreseeability. Targeting ties the defendant to the forum.
A defendant should be subject to jurisdiction when he or she has
intentionally caused harm in the forum. 38 2

382. In the above hypothetical concerning an internet worm, the defendant
targeted Maine, even though he did not know that harm would occur there,
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On the other hand, the forum should not have to be the focal
point of the intentional conduct. Intentional conduct can be
targeted at more than one state. As stated with the second factor,
jurisdiction can be proper in more than one state, and if the
defendant targeted intentional harm at the defendant in more
than one state, then jurisdiction should be proper in all states the
defendant targeted.
Libel and similar torts will usually be proper in the plaintiff's
home state, even for corporate plaintiffs, because the defendant
targets that state by intentionally causing harm to the plaintiff in
its home state. It is not that the defendant knew that the plaintiff
resided in the forum, but that the defendant knew that its
intentional actions would harm the plaintiff at his or her home.
However, the court in Reynolds was correct that jurisdiction was
not proper in the plaintiffs home state of Ohio over an
international athletic organization that had released a statement
that the plaintiff, an internationally known track star, had failed a
drug test.3 83 The plaintiffs international reputation had been
affected, and there had been no targeting of Ohio.384 Similarly,
Schwarzenegger, which found that California lacked jurisdiction
over an Ohio car dealership that had violated the right of publicity
of the California actor (and now Governor), was correct because
the defendant solely targeted Ohio. 38 5 The result would be the
same in both cases under this author's personal jurisdiction test;
neither defendant made a purposeful connection with the
respective forum state.
Most of the jurisdiction cases discussed in Part I that granted
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants came to the correct
conclusions.
Haisten, which involved a Cayman Islands
malpractice fund whose only purpose was to self-insure California
doctors, was decided correctly. First, the fund had purposefully
established a significant connection with California.
It was
insuring California doctors for their California conduct. Moreover,
the fund was obtaining a benefit from California-the payments
from the doctors related to the practice of medicine in California.
Although the fund had cleverly avoided physical contacts with
California, a defendant should not be able to avoid jurisdiction
with a state when the out-of-state conduct is intended to have
38 6
effects within the state.
The court's holding in Dakota Industries, which involved a
trademark infringement claim by a South Dakota clothing
because he intended harm anywhere the Internet reached.
entire world targets every state.
383. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120-21.
384. Id.
385. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807.
386. See Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1399.

Targeting the
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company against a California clothing company, was also correct.
Although the California corporation did not sell any products in
South Dakota and had no physical contacts with it, the corporation
knew that harm was occurring in South Dakota to a South Dakota
company through its actions. Thus, the harm the California
corporation knowingly caused in South Dakota created a
connection to South Dakota that justifies the assertion of
jurisdiction over it under the Due Process Clause. The trademark
infringement and the harm it caused was not the unilateral act of
38 7
another; it was the defendant's intentional conduct.
Although there should be restrictions as to how far
jurisdiction should extend, some of the cases discussed in Part I
have limited jurisdiction too much. In Rosenstein, the court found
that Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction over a Florida corporation
that had allegedly libeled a Pennsylvania produce wholesaler and
distributor by sending letters to Florida strawberry sellers.3 88 The
court based its decision on the fact that the brunt of the harm had
been felt in Florida. 389 The court should have granted jurisdiction
in this case because the defendant had intentionally caused harm
in Pennsylvania. Since the defendant had dealt with the plaintiff
before, it knew where the plaintiffs business was located, and it
obviously intended that the plaintiff be harmed there. While harm
was felt in Florida where the libel was published, significant harm
was also felt in Pennsylvania, where the plaintiffs produce
business was affected. As noted above, there is no reason to limit
jurisdiction to one forum when harm is caused in more than one
forum. The defendant targeted both Florida and Pennsylvania.
Not only had the defendant intended to harm the plaintiffs
dealings with strawberry sellers in Florida, it purposefully and
knowingly interfered with plaintiffs produce business in
Pennsylvania.
A business cannot sell strawberries in
Pennsylvania unless it can buy them from a grower.
IMO Industries similarly set the boundary of personal
jurisdiction too narrowly when it ruled that New Jersey lacked
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. 390
In IMO
Industries, a German corporation had intentionally interfered with
a New Jersey corporation's sale of its Italian subsidiary. 391 The
defendant had sent its letters to the Italian subsidiary and a New
York investment firm. Nevertheless, the German defendant knew
that significant harm would occur in New Jersey when the sale of
the subsidiary fell through, causing IMO significant financial

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1391.
Rosenstein, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75.
Id. at 273.
Cf. 155 F.3d at 256.
Id. at 258.
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losses. 3 92 The focal point of the conduct might have been Italy, the
home of the subsidiary, or New York, where the investment firm
was located, but the defendant had still made enough of a
connection with New Jersey by knowingly causing significant
harm there.
While personal jurisdiction should be broad enough to allow
plaintiffs to fully vindicate their rights, there are limits on
personal jurisdiction. Wolgin was correct that a Pennsylvania
court did not have jurisdiction over a Florida real estate broker for
misrepresentation in the sale of a condominium located in Florida
and over a Florida decorator for breach of contract concerning
improvements on that condominium.3 93 Although the broker had
advertised in national magazines and made unconnected phone
calls to Pennsylvania, it did no business in Pennsylvania and the
sale of the condominium was negotiated and occurred in Florida.
Similarly, the decorator did not do business in Pennsylvania and
Although
the original contract was executed in Florida.
subsequent contracts were faxed to Pennsylvania, they concerned
performance in Florida. In addition, the decorator did not make
any trips to Pennsylvania concerning the improvements, but the
plaintiff had gone to Florida in connection with the improvements.
Jurisdiction is unconstitutional over both defendants. The
broker had not made any purposeful ties with Pennsylvania or
derived any benefit from a connection with Pennsylvania. The fact
that a party is from the forum should not create jurisdiction in the
forum, as long as there are no other connections with the forum.
The harm occurred in Florida; the alleged misrepresentation by
the broker caused the defendant to buy a Florida condominium.
There was no targeting of Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania resident
may now have less money, but that is not a Pennsylvania harm.
The plaintiff made a connection with Florida by going to Florida
and buying property there. This unilateral act by the plaintiff
does not connect the broker with Pennsylvania. Similarly, the
transaction with the decorator was significantly connected only to
Florida. The improvements were for a Florida condominium by a
Florida decorator. The harm from the breach of contract was felt
in Florida, not Pennsylvania. The decorator did not reach into
Pennsylvania; the plaintiffs reached into Florida.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the reasonableness
prong of the due process inquiry should be triggered only in
extreme circumstances-i.e., when the defendant lacks the
resources to mount a defense in the forum because of the foreign
forum. As mentioned earlier, courts look at seven factors in
connection with reasonableness in regard to the effects test:

392. Id.
393. Cf. Wolgin, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11461, at *26.
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(1) the extent of the defendants' purposeful injection into the forum
state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the
forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in
convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an
394
alternative forum.

Because of this author's proposed minimal reasonableness
requirement, analysis of these factors is not really necessary.
However, this author agrees with those courts that have declared
that the defendant's purposeful interjection into the home state's
affairs and the interest of the forum state in protecting its
residents usually outweighs any burden on the defendants or
interference with the foreign state's sovereignty. 395 A defendant
should not be able to complain about the burden of defending in a
foreign legal system when that defendant has intentionally caused
harm in that forum. Similarly, a forum should not have to defer to
a foreign jurisdiction when its laws have been intentionally
violated.
Accordingly, the majority in Core-Vent was wrong when it
held that a California court did not have jurisdiction on
reasonableness grounds over Swedish professors who had defamed
a California corporation's products in articles written in Sweden
but published worldwide. 396 First, any burden of having to defend
in a foreign jurisdiction is far outweighed by the fact that the
defendants had intentionally caused harm in California and
California's interest in protecting its citizens. A plaintiff should
not have to travel to a foreign land to obtain justice when the
plaintiff has been intentionally harmed at its home. Second,
Sweden's sovereignty is not offended by California jurisdiction and
the application of California law when the injury is felt in
California and California law has been violated. Finally, the
defendants could not show that they could not mount a proper
defense; in fact, the corporation for which they were consultants
397
conducted their defense.
C. Evaluationof PersonalJurisdictionin the
Crazy Horse Litigation
The Crazy Horse litigation tested the boundary of personal
jurisdiction.
On the one hand were defendants who had no
physical contacts with South Dakota; on the other hand were
394. Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114.
See also supra note 181 and
accompanying text.
395. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
396. See 11 F.3d at 1483-84, 1490.
397. Id. at 1494-95 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs who might not receive justice outside South Dakota.
The court's decision to allow jurisdiction over the defendants
was correct under a broad reading of the effects test used by many
courts. The first prong is easy: the complaint alleged that the
defendant intentionally violated plaintiffs' right to privacy. The
second prong was also satisfied: the plaintiffs felt the brunt of the
harm in South Dakota. The plaintiffs all lived in South Dakota,
and they all felt the harm there. Finally, the defendants had
targeted the plaintiffs in South Dakota. After they had been
informed that harm was being caused by their distribution of
Crazy Horse Malt Liquor, they knew that harm was being caused
in South Dakota.
On the other hand, this analysis could be questioned under
some courts' narrower interpretations of the effects test. Was the
brunt of the harm really felt in South Dakota? As noted above, the
malt liquor was not distributed in South Dakota. Wasn't the right
to privacy violated in those states where the malt liquor was
distributed, rather than where the plaintiffs lived? Similarly, did
the defendants target South Dakota? Rather, didn't they target
the states in which they distributed the malt liquor?
Moreover, the case might be distinguishable from Calder. In
Calder, the libelous material was distributed in the forum state.
Here, the defendants did not distribute the malt liquor in South
Dakota. Is the Crazy Horse litigation more like Reynolds, where a
press release stating that an athlete had failed a drug test affected
his worldwide reputation, rather than targeted him in his home
state?
There are also problems in applying the seven-part
Does the extent of the defendants'
reasonableness test.
interjection into the forum state's affairs and the forum state's
interest in the dispute justify the burden on the defendants and
the extent of the conflict of the sovereignty with the defendants'
home states? As was true of targeting, is there any interjection
into the forum state's affairs? How does a court evaluate the
conflict of sovereignty between South Dakota and New Jersey or
New York, the domiciles of the defendants? As noted in Part II, if
the case is heard in South Dakota, the plaintiffs would have a
significant chance of succeeding, while if the case is heard in New
Jersey or New York, it is uncertain what the outcome might be.
How does the availability of an alternate forum in New Jersey or
New York affect the balance? Those states could certainly provide
a forum for this action, and the action would be subject to all the
rights of the American legal system, but the plaintiffs might have
a significantly reduced chance of prevailing than in South Dakota.
In Part III.A., I proposed a minimal constraints test for
personal jurisdiction that I feel satisfies the requirements of due
process, but that sweeps away hard to apply concepts like
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foreseeability and purposeful availment and eliminates the need
for balancing under the traditional notions factor. Not only does
this test broaden the availability of personal jurisdiction, it
simplifies it, making the determination of personal jurisdiction
easier. While this author believes that the court's analysis in the
Crazy Horse litigation was correct, the alternative analysis above
suggests that a simpler test is called for.
Personal jurisdiction is proper over the defendants in the
Crazy Horse litigation under the first part of this author's test:
Does the defendant have a significant, purposeful contact or
connection with the forum or has the defendant knowingly
received some benefit from the forum state in connection with the
forum's regulatory authority? The defendant has a significant,
purposeful contact or connection to the forum: The defendant has
knowingly caused harm to the plaintiffs in South Dakota through
its wide-spread distribution of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor in
violation of plaintiffs' right to privacy under tribal law. Under this
prong, it does not matter whether the brunt of the harm or the
focal point was in South Dakota; all that is important is that the
defendants knowingly created a significant connection with the
state. As has been stated previously in this Article, is it unfair to
require a defendant to answer in the forum when he or she has
knowingly harmed the plaintiff there?
Personal jurisdiction is also proper in South Dakota under the
second half of the test: Is defending the lawsuit in the forum so
burdensome that the defendant cannot mount a proper defense?
There is no indication that the defendants were unable to mount a
proper defense in South Dakota.
They were successful
businessmen who apparently owned a thriving business.
Certainly, there would be some burden to the defendants from
defending in South Dakota. For example, they would have to
travel to South Dakota to participate in their defense. However,
they could (and did) hire local counsel to appear for them and
assist them in South Dakota. There is no reason to believe that
their attorney's fees would be any greater in South Dakota than in
New York or New Jersey; in fact, their litigation costs might be
cheaper in South Dakota.
Does the above analysis solve the clash of cultures and values
that was mentioned in Part II? I think it does. Both parties had
legitimate arguments concerning personal jurisdiction and the
merits of their interests. However, the defendants reached into
South Dakota to interfere with the plaintiffs' interest. In addition,
the plaintiffs had not created the clash of cultures and values; the
defendants had.
IV. CONCLUSION

Minimal constraints on personal jurisdiction are fair to both
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defendants and plaintiffs. Minimal constraints prevent a state
from asserting jurisdiction over individuals who have no
These
connection or a weak connection to a jurisdiction.
constraints are also fair to plaintiffs because they allow them to
vindicate their rights in the appropriate jurisdiction.
If the court in the Crazy Horse litigation had not found that
South Dakota had jurisdiction over the defendants, the plaintiffs
would probably have not been able to properly litigate their claims
in New York or New Jersey. So the court's decision on personal
jurisdiction allowed the plaintiffs to adjudicate their claims in a
court that would treat them in the manner they deserved, and it
facilitated settlement.
Despite the correctness of the court's decision, the effects test
is problematic. The second and third factors can be interpreted in
broad or narrow manners as the cases examined in Part I
demonstrate. This means that some plaintiffs will get to litigate
their claims in the proper forum, while others with similar claims
will have to go to distant forums, which might hinder the proper
adjudication of their grievances. This is why the test of personal
jurisdiction needs to be simplified and broadened while retaining
some protection for defendants. In this way, personal jurisdiction
can respect the dignity of plaintiffs and defendants.

